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FOREWORD 
A key problem area at IIASA is the study of how goods and 
resources --as well as 'bads' such as costs, pollution, and 
risks --can or should be shared among different nations, groups, 
or individuals. This raises the question of what is meant by a 
fair division --and, if this question can be answered at all, 
how fair divisions can be achieved. One of the situations studied 
in the System and Decision Sciences Area was how to allocate or 
"apportion" discrete entities in proportion to predetermined 
claims, a problem which encompasses many situations including for 
example the apportionment of political rperesentation among dif- 
ferent regions and constituencies. The result of this study was 
the development of a general theory to deal with such problems, 
together with concrete criteria of fairness which will hopefully 
prove useful to analyzing larger classes of problems. 
T H E  THEORY O F  A P P O R T I O N M E N T  
M.L. Balinski and H.P. Young 
1. TBE PROBLEM 
A widely held ideal of fair representation is represen- 
tation in proportion to some numerical criterion. In the 
United States each state receives seats in the House of Represen- 
tatives proportionally to its population, but in any case is as- 
sured of at least one seat. In France each department is given 
a number of deputies in like manner, but is assured of at least 
two. In the European Parliament each country is also accorded 
representation in proportion to its population, but is assured 
a minimum number of seats that ranges between 6 and 36 depending 
upon the country in question. 
A specific problem of apportionment is given by a vector of 
"populations" p = (pl, ...,ps), an integer "size of house" h 2 0, 
- 
- 
and a vector of "minimum requirements" r = r ,  , r S  0 The 
.-. 
Pi are positive integers and the r non-negative integers. Usually i 
the minimum requirements are a common number r. For the United 
States r = 1 and for France r = 2. However, Canada and the Euro- 
pean Parliament are instances where minimum requirements differ. 
Occasionally, maximum limits may also be imposed on the number 
of seats allowed to each state, as for example the U.S. Constitu- 
tion's stated limit of one per thirty thousand, though this is 
not an issue today. An apportionment of h among s is, therefore, 
a vector a = (al, ..., as) of non-negative integers ai 2 r that 
- i 
sum to h. In the sequel we will explicitly treat r = 0 and for 
- - 
the most part leave as exercises for the reader the verification 
of the general cases. 
The question which we address is: what is a fair method 
for determining apportionments? This is done in the framework 
and the language of allocating representation among geographical 
regions. However, many other problems have the same form. In 
proportional representation the problem is to allocate seats 
(Cotteret and Emeri (1 970) . 
proportionally to party vote totals A In manpower planning 
a problem is to allocate jobs in proportion to certain character- 
(Mayberry, 1978) . 
istics of the labor pool A Service facilities --courts, judges, 
or hospitals --may need to be allotted to areas in proportion to 
the numbers of people to be served. In reporting statistical 
findings there is the problem of making tables of rounded percen- 
tages add up to 100 percent. Any problem in which h objects 
are to be allocated in non-negative integers proportionally to 
some numerical criterion belongs to this class, and the theory 
below applies to it. Some of the principles we discuss are par- 
ticularly relevant to the regional representation problem while 
other principles may be more telling for other applications 
(Balinski and Young 1978b, 1979a). 
Example 1.1. Consider the apportionment problem with 
populations p = (27 744, 25 178, 19 951, 14 610, 9 225, 3 292) 
- 
and h = 36. Let qi = pih/(l.p.) be the quota of state i, so that 
3 3 
q = (9.988, 9.064, 7.182, 5.261, 3.321, 1.185) represents the 
- 
vector of "fair shares". What integer apportionment should each 
state receive? 
Example 1.2. Members of the European Parliament are now 
elected by direct universal suffrage in each of the nine coun- 
tries that constitute the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) . 
The apportionment of seats was decided upon in April 1976 after 
a period of intense negotiation. By previously agreed-upon con- 
vention, the apportionment was to be proportional to the popula- 
tions of the respective countries and yet assure each country 
at least the number of seats it held in the previous Parliament. 
The populations of the nine countries were estimated to be (in 
thousands): Germany 62 041, United Kingdom 56 056, Italy 55 361, 
France 53 780, Netherlands 13 450, Belgium 9 772, Denmark 5 052, 
Ireland 3 086 and Luxembourg 357. The total population was 
258 955 000. The vector of minimum requirements was r = (36,36, 
- 
36,36,14,14,10,10,6). The negotiation produced the apportionment 
a = (81,81,81,81,25,24,16,15,6).  Compare this solution with the 
- 
quotas. 
2. ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES 
We seek a method of apportionment, that is, a rule which 
for every s-vector p > 0 and integer h 2 0 gives an apportionment 
- 
- 
of h among s. A single-valued function does not suffice as the 
concept for a method. For suppose two states with identical pop- 
ulations are to share an odd number of seats 2a+l. There are only 
two natural solutionsr (a,a+l) and (a+l,a), but there is no basis 
in terms of the proportional ideal for preferring one to the other. 
Any method that is fair must admit both possibilities as solutions. 
Formally, then, define a mathod to be a multiple valued func- 
tion M, consisting of a set of apportionments of h among s for 
each s-vector p > 0 and integer h 1 0 .  A particular PI-solution 
- 
-- 
is a single-valued function f with f(p,h) - = aE!l(p,h). - A partic- 
- 
ular M-solution breaks every "tie" in some arbitrary fashion, e.g., 
it might choose (a,a+l) in the case of two equal states sharing 
2a+l seats. Ties can also arise in more interesting ways that 
depend on the logic of the particular method used. 
The ideal of proportionality immediately imposes several 
elementary properties that a method should enjoy. If all popula- 
tions change by the same proportion then, since there is no change 
in the proportional shares of the states, there should be no change 
in the set of apportionments. Specifically, M is homogeneous if 
the M-apportionments for p and h are the same as the M-apportion- 
- 
ments for Ap and h, for any positive rational number A. This 
-. 
means that any positive s-vector of rational numbers may be con- 
sidered as "populations". 
Proportionality concerns the size of populations, not their 
names or other characteristics. Therefore, permuting the populations 
to obtain a "new" problem should only result in apportionments 
which are permuted in the same way. Methods with this property 
are called symmetric. 
Proportionality means that whenever a problem can be solved 
perfectly in integers then it must be. M is weakly pr~portional 
if whenever an apportionment a is proportional to p, then a is 
- - - 
the unique M-apportionment for p > 0 when h = lai. 
- 
Moreover, as 
- 
the house size grows solutions should increasingly approach the 
ideal of proportionality. So if b' is an M-apportionment for 
- 
p > 0 and b is integer and proportional to b' with lbi<lbj then 
- - - - 
b should be the unique apportionment in M(p,lbi). This means 
- - 
that if ?I splits 6 seats between two states 3 and 3, then it must 
split 4 seats between the same two in no way other than 2 and 2. 
A method that satisfies this condition and is also weakly pro- 
portional is called proportional. Although all reasonable methods 
are proportional, much of the theory is developed using the weaker 
notion. 
Ties--where a method gives several different apportionments 
for the same problem--arise naturally not only from considerations 
of symmetry but also from changing populations. One expects that 
as populations change more and more in some direction a point 
(i.e. an s-vector p) is eventually reached where the method changes 
- 
apportionments, otherwise the ideal of proportionality could not 
be met. These natural tie points depend, of course, upon the 
* 
method that is used. One way of describing a tie point p is to 
- 
say that arbitrarily small perturbations about it can produce 
different apportionments: a slight increase in one state's popu- 
lation relative to an other's may result in one apportionment, 
while a slight decrease may result in another apportionment. 
* 
Such tie points p may involve irrational numbers. Hence it is 
- 
important to extend the concept of method to all real populations 
p E R', p > 0. We say that a method is complete if whenever 
- - - 
p n - , ~ > O  - and a ~ ~ ( ~ " , h )  for every n, then a€M(p,h). A methodM 
- - - - - - 
is completed by letting a €M(p) for p ER' if and only if there 
- - - 
n is a sequence of rational s-vectors p converging to p such that 
- - 
a  EM(^") for all n. Any natural view of proportional allocation 
- - 
carries with it the idea of completeness; however some consequences 
of the theory also hold for methods that are not complete. 
From this point on, methods of apportionment will always be 
assumed to be homogeneous, symmetric, weakly proportional, and 
complete, unless stated otherwise. These are the rock-bottom 
requirements that must be satisfied by any method that is worthy 
of consideration. 
Proposition 2.1. The methods of Hamilton, Jefferson, Lowndes, 
Webster, Adams, Dean, and Hill are homogeneous, symmetric, 
weakly proportional, and complete. 
Proposition 2.2. The method of Hamilton is proportional. 
Proposition 2.3. The completion of a method is complete, and 
inherits the properties of homogeneity, symmetry, and weak 
proportionality. 
Proposition 2.4. In the presence of minimum requirements --or of 
minimum and maximum requirements --it is natural to generalize 
symmetry by attaching the requirements to the particular states 
(e.g., recall the European Parliament). Thus a method is sym- 
metric if permuting the populations results in permuting the 
apportionments in the same way provided the requirements remain 
satisfied. Homogeneity and completeness hold in the case of 
minimum requirements without any further modification. Show 
that weak proportionality and proportionality can be modified 
by simply imposing the requirements as constraints. 
3. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
This section reviews the different types of methods that 
have traditionally been followed. The claims for these methods 
have typically been based on the computational procedures they 
employ, in other words on ad hoe  considerations. Moreover it 
often happens that these differing computational approaches 
represent the same method in different guises. 
A most natural approach is to compute the quotas and round 
in the usual way. But this does not always work (e.g., the 
example of Section 1). Hamilton's method is one way around the 
difficulty. Another is to choose an ideal district size or 
X d i v i s o r  x, to compute the q u o t i e n t s  of each state qi = pi/x, and 
to round these according to some rule. The proposal of Webster 
was to round these in the usual way: remainders above one-half 
are rounded up, remainders below one-half are rounded down, and 
a remainder of exactly one-half may be rounded either up or down -- 
it is a natural tie point. In general, for any real number z, 
let [z] denote the integer closest to z. If the fractional part 
of z is one-half then [zl has two possible values. The method  
of k e b s t e r  is 
W(p,h) = {a : ai = [pi/x] , liai = h for some choice of x} 
. 
- - 
If there are states having quotients with a remainder of one- 
half then all possible values of [pi/x] are admitted that sum 
to h. 
Instead of "ordinary" rounding the same approach may be used 
with rounding of quotients taken at other points, as was for 
example proposed by Jefferson and Adams. In general, any rounding 
procedure may be described by specifying a dividing point d(a) 
in each interval of quotients [a,a+l] for each nonnegative in- 
teger a. 
For any real number z a d-rounding of 2. [zld, is an integer 
a such that d (a-1) 5 - z = < d (a), which is unique unless z = d (a) , 
in which case it takes on either of the values a or a+l. To 
avoid more than two-way ties it is required that d(a) < d(a+l). 
Any monotone increasing d(a) defined for all integers a - 0 and 
satisfying a ( - d(a) ( - a+l is called a divisor criterion. The 
divisor method based on d is 
M(p,h) = {a :ai=[pi/xId and liai=h for some XI . 
- w 
To accommodate the case d(0) = 0 the possibility x = is allowed. 
The five traditional methods are described as divisor methods in 
Table 3.1 . 
Method : Adams Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
d (a) : a a (a+l ) / (a+&) Ja (a+l ) a+: a+l 
Table 3.1 The Five Traditional Divisor Methods 
An alternate but equivalent description is that a is an M- 
- 
apportionment if and only if there exists an x such that for all 
a > 0, pi/d (ai-1 ) 2 x 2 pi/d (ai) and for all ai = 0, x > pi/d (ai) . i - 
So the divisor method based on d can also be described in terms 
of a min-max inequality: 
~ ( p , h )  ..- = f : min pi/d(ai-1) lmax - p./d(a.) . lai =h) . 
- a.>O a.>O I 3 
1 I= 
Proposition 3 . 1 .  Each of the traditional five divisor 
methods gives a different apportionment for the problem 
of Example 1.1. 
Proposition 3 . 2 .  Every divisor method M has particular 
solutions that avoid the Alabama paradox. 
Proposition 3 . 3 .  The divisor method M based on d may also 
be described recursively as follows: (i) f (p,O) = 0, 
- - 
(ii) suppose a ~M(p,h) and k is some state satisfying 
- - 
pk/d(ak) = maxi pi/d (ai). Then b - EM(pIh+l), - with bk = ak+l 
and bi = ai for i k. 
Proposition 3 . 4 .  A divisor method M based on d for problems with 
+ both minimum and maximum requirements r ( r may be described 
< 
- - 
as follows 
+ 
M(p.h) = {a : a =mid(ri.ri, [Pi/xld) and liai = h for some x) 
- - i 
where mid(u,v,w) for any three unordered reals satisfying 
u 5 - v 5 - w is v. Derive the corresponding min-max and recursive 
description. 
There are an infinite number of different divisor methods. 
How is one to choose among them? An ingenious approach to this 
question, first suggested by Joseph Hill and fully carried 
out by E.V. Huntington (1921, 1928), was-to make pairwisp 
com?ar<sons of state's representations. "Between any two states, 
there will practically always be a certain inequality which 
gives one of the states a slight advantage over the other. A 
transfer of one representative from the more favored state to 
the less favored state will ordinarily reverse the sign of this 
inequality, so that the more favored state now becomes the less 
favored, and vice versa. Whether such a transfer should be made 
or not depends on whether the $mount of inequality'between the 
two states after the transfer is less or greater than it was 
before; if the 'amount of inequality' is reduced by the transfer, 
it is obvious that the transfer should be made. The fundamental 
question therefore at once presents itself, as to how the 'amount 
of inequality' between two states is to be measured" (Hufitington, 1928)., 
Let states i and j, having populations p and p. be appor- i I ' 
tioned ai and a seats respectively. It is unambiguous to say j 
that i is favored relative to j if and only if ai/pi > aj/p . j 
One natural measure of the inequality between i and j is there- 
fore /ai/pi -aj/pj 1 .  
Huntington's argument is that if this inequality can be 
reduced by a transfer of seats between i and j ,  then such a trans- 
fer should be made. In particular, if I (ai-l)/pi-(a.+l)/pj/ < 
3 
1 ai/pi - a ,/P, 1 I then i should give up one seat to j. Of course 
it is quite conceivable that cvsry apportionment is unstable, 
i.e. admits such transfers. Remarkably enough this is not the 
case. An apportionment admits no such transfers if for all pairs 
i and j with ai/p 2 a./p 
1 -  I j 
Therefore such an a must be a Webster method apportionment. 
- 
Conversely, every Webster method apportionment satisfies ( 3 . 1 ) ,  
hence satisfies the transfer test. In particular this pairwise 
comparison approach has produced a house monotone method! 
Unfortunately for this logic the statement that i is favored 
relative to j can be expressed in many different ways. The in- 
equality ai/pi > aj/pj can be rearranged by cross-multiplication 
in 2 4  = 16 different ways. Hence to measure the inequality be- 
tween states i and j it would be equally valid to consider the 
inequalities between the numbers p./a and p./a or between ai 
1 i J jt 
and a.p./p or pi and p.a./a or p.a./p.a and 1 ,  or pi/pj and 
J 1 j' J 1 j' 1 1  ~i 
ai/a etc. j ' 
Not every measure of inequality gives stable apportionments: 
for some measures there exist problems for which every apportion- 
ment can be improved upon by some transfer. Huntington showed 
that, except for four such "unworkable" measures, all others re- 
sulted in the methods of either Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster, or 
Jefferson. Examples of tests that lead to these methods are given 
in Table 3.2. Huntington argued that it is not the absolute 
:Tethod : kdams Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
ai/pi 
Test : ai-a. (pi/pj p./a.-p./a. -- 1 ai/pi-aj/pj ai (P ./pi) -a. 
3 3 a,'pj 3 3 
(for ai/pi2aj/pj) 
Table 3.2 Pairwise Comparison Tests for Five Traditional Methods 
difference that should be used in measuring the inequality be- 
tween two numbers y and z, but the relative difference (y-z(/ 
min(y,z), and he observed that the relative differences in all 
16 cases are the same: a.p./a.p - 1. All relative differences 
1 1  1 1  
yield the method of Hill, or what Huntington called the method 
of equal proportions. This is a neat argument, yet it boils 
down to a question of preference for one among several competing 
tests of inequality. 
Proposition 3.5. The test lai/a -p./p.I does not always yield j 1 1  
stable apportionments. Use the three state example with p - = 
(762,534,304) and h = 16 to show that no stable solution exists. 
Proposition 3.6. Modify the pairwise comparison approach to 
accommodate minimum and maximum requirements. 
A favorite approach of operations research analysts is con- 
strained optimization. Not surprisingly it has been advocated 
for apportionment. The variables in the problem are a = (al, ..., as) 
-. 
and the constraints are that a be nonnegative and integer with 
- 
liai = h. The question that remains is: what function should 
be optimized? 
Ideally one would like to have the ai "close to" the quotas 
qi = pih/p, where p = lipi is the total population. One plausible 
2 
choice is to minimize Lilai-qil, or perhaps instead li(ai-qi) . 
In either case the m e t h o d  of Hamilton solves the problem: first, 
* 
give every state its Lower quota LqiJ; second, give the remaining 
* 
LzJ is the largest integer less than or equal to z. 
l i q i - L q . 1  s e a t s  o n e  e a c h  t o  s t a t e s  h a v i n g  t h e  l a r g e s t  r e m a i n d e r s ,  
1 
The " e r r o r "  i n h e r e n t  i n  a  t r i a l  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  c a n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
b e  measured i n  o t h e r  ways. a  f q i  means t h a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  d i s -  i 
t r i c t  s i z e  i n  s t a t e  i ,  pi /a i ,  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h e  a v e r a g e  na- 
t i o n a l  d i s t r i c t  s i z e ,  p /h .  So ,  p e r h a p s ,  it m i g h t  b e  r e a s o n a b l e  
2  
t o  minimize  1. 1 p .  / a i  - p/h 1 or 1. (p i /a i  - p/h)  . T h e s e  y i e l d  t w o  1 1  1 
d i f f e r e n t  me thods ,  n e i t h e r  o f  which  i s  H a m i l t o n ' s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
and  j u s t  a s  r e a s o n a b l y ,  o n e  migh t  c h o o s e  t o  m i n i m i z e  i i l a i / p  
- h / p l  i 
or l i ( a i / p i  - h / p )  2 ,  o r  o t h e r  v a r i a t i o n s  on  t h e  theme.  
I n  1910 S a i n t e - L a g ~ e  a r g u e d  - - a s  d i d  F . W .  Owens i n  1921 -- 
t h a t  i f  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  b a s i c  e l e m e n t s  whose 
s h a r e s  a r e  t o  b e  made a s  n e a r l y  e q u a l  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e n  t h e  error 
2  
s h o u l d  b e  measured  by  lipi (a i /pi  - h/p)  . The method o f  W e b s t e r ,  
it t u r n s  o u t ,  m i n i m i z e s  t h i s  f u n c t i o n .  
To see t h i s  n o t e  t h a t  
Thus t h e  c o n s t r a i n e d  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  m i n i -  
2 
m i z i n g  Lai/pi when l a i  = h ,  a .  > 0  i n t e g e r .  I f  a  i s  o p t i m a l  t h e n  
1 = - 
f o r  a l l  a i , a j ,  w i t h  i $ j and  a i  > 0, a  t r a n s f e r  f rom i t o  j can-  
n o t  improve t h e  o b j e c t i v e ,  t h a t  i s ,  
which is  t h e  same a s  
Therefore, a optimal implies 
- 
which is the min-max inequality that characterizes Webster appor- 
tionments. 
Conversely, suppose that a satisfies the Webster min-max 
- 
inequality or, what is the same thing, 
(2ai+l)/pi 2 (2aj-l)/pj for all a. > 0 and a > 0 . 1 = j 
+ 
If b is some apportionment different from a, let S = {i :bi >ai}, 
- - 
- + S = { j  :b Ca.1 and let bi = ai + tii for i E S  , bj = a A .  for j I j I 
j E S-. Then IS+ 6i = IS- = a > 0 and, by the above inequalities, 
+ (3.2) (2ai+6i)/pi 2 (2aj-Aj)/pj for all i E S  and j ES- . 
Now we can see that 
since the last term is simply the sum of a differences between 
the left and right hand sides of (3.2). Therefore b gives to the 
- 
objective function a value that can be no smaller than that of a, 
- 
showing that a must be a minimizing solution. 
- 
If instead the average district sizes are taken as the basic 
elements to be made as equal as possible, the natural measure 
2 
of statistical error to minimize would be l.a.(pi/ai-p/h) . 
1 1  
Sainte-Lagfie (1910) suggested this possibility and cryptically 
remarked "one is led to a more complex rule"; this rule turns 
out to be Hill's method, as Huntington (1928) later showed. 
Thc total error inherent in an apportiunment could be small, 
while the error for some particular state might be unreasonably 
large. The objective might therefore be formulated in terms of 
making the worst error for any state as small as possible. There 
are, again, many different ways of realizing this idea. One such 
approach, advocated by Burt and Harris (1963) is the objective rnin rnax 
a iIj I pi/ai - pj/a. I . Why not then take instead min max lai/pi-a./p.I? 3 a irj 3 3 
In a slightly different spirit one might choose rnin rnax lai - qi 1 
i 
or min rnax (p./a -p/hI. 
a i 1 i 
- 
A still different point of view is to consider a state's 
situation by itself, neither comparing it to another nor to any 
fixed standard. Min rnax pi/ai makes the least advantaged state 
a i 
as advantaged as It is solved by the method of Adams. 
Min rnax ai/pi makes the most advantaged state as little advantaged 
a i 
as possible. It is solved by the method of Jefferson. 
The moral of this tale is that one cannot choose objective 
functions with impunity, despite current practices in applied 
mathematics. The choice of an objective is, by and large an ad 
hoe affair. The same is true of the other traditional approaches 
that have been used: Why advocate one divisor d(a) rather than 
another? Why adopt one measure of pairwise inequality rather 
than another? Why choose one objective function rather than 
another? Of much deeper significance than the formulas that are 
used are the properties they enjoy. 
Proposit5on 3 . 7 .  (Birkhof f ( 1  976) . Hamilton apportionments 
minimize 11 a - qi 1 , 1 (ai - qi) * and, actually, any 2 norm i P 
2 
Proposition 3 . 8 .  Hill apportionments minimize la.(p./ai-p/h) 1 1  . 
Proposition 3 . 9 .  The methods defined by min max 1 pi/ai - pj/a 1 
a - i,j 
and min max la -qil both admit the Alabama paradox. 
a i i 
- 
Proposition 3 . 1 0 .  Jefferson apportionments solve rnin max ai/pi 
a i 
. 
and Adams apportionments solve min max pi/ai. 
a i 
Proposition 3 . 1 1 .  The constrained optimization approach can be 
modified to accommodate both minimum requirements and maximum 
requirements. The modifications may be made so as to lead to 
solutions that are consistent with the parallel modifications 
used for the previous approaches. 
4. PRINCIPLES: POPULATION YONOTOMICITY 
History and common sense have provided the principles we need 
to sift through the vast number of different numerical apportion- 
ment schemes and determine which are appropriate to the problem. 
A few fundamental principles suffice: consistency with changes 
in populations, avoiding the Alabama paradox, lack of bias, and 
staying within the quota. The interplay of these four simple 
ideas provides a logical framework with which to judge the merits 
of different methods. 
What methods should be seriously considered? The view of the 
National Academy of Sciences Committees was that "there are only 
five methods that require consideration at this time" --namely the 
five traditional divisor methods that have kept recurring through- 
out the two hundred year history of the problem and were shown by 
Huntington to be variations on the single theme of pairwise com- 
parisons. The single most important criterion applied by the 
Academy Committees to judge between these five methods was bias. 
Their conclusion was that Hill's method was the least biased. But 
a careful analysis of historical data shows that this conclusion 
is wrong: Hill's method is consistently biased toward the small 
states, while Webster's method is apparently unbiased and is the 
only one of the five that is so. In other words, a straightforward 
empirical analysis of an historically important class of methods 
points to Webster's as the preferred one, and little or no theory 
is needed to reach this conclusion. 
The foregoing argument is simple but limited in scope. What 
about other methods? In particular, what about the divisor methods, 
of which the five are but special examples? To study this infinite 
I .  
class with respect to bias requires theoretical models that are 
treated in the next section. The conclusion, however, is the 
same: different models of bias all point to Webster's as the 
only method in the class that is unbiased. 
But why should the analysis be restricted to divisor methods? 
After all, they represent but one computational approach out of 
many. The reason lies not in their computational attractiveness-- 
many methods, including Hamilton's, could be said to be more 
attractive computationally. The reason is more fundamental: they 
are the only methods that are consistent with changing data. 
This section is devoted to establishing this result. 
Of the various parameters affecting apportionment--populations, 
house size, and number of states, --the former is constantly in 
flux, while the last two typically change less frequently. It is 
essential that a method be consistent with changes in all three 
of these parameters, and most particularly with changes in popu- 
lations. If over the short term both the house size h and number 
of seats s are assumed to be fixed then it suffices to have a 
* 
partial method M (p), which gives a set of apportionments of h for 
- 
* 
every s-vector p > 0. M should behave monotonically in popula- 
- - 
tions: roughly speaking, states that increase in size should get 
more, while those that decrease should get less. Formally this 
desire can be interpreted in several different ways. 
One approach to population monotonicity would be the usual 
mathematical definition: 
( 4 . 1 )  If pi increases a n d  all p.(j #i) remain the same, 
3 
then i's apportionment does not decrease. 
This notion was proposed as early as 1907 by Erlang and has been 
studied by Hylland (1975), (1978). The difficulty with this de- 
finition is that it is not relevant to the problem in an applied 
sense, since such comparisons scarcely ever occur in practice. 
Populations change dynamically, and any useful definition of 
population monotonicity must reflect this fact. 
An alternate definition that seems more appealing at first 
sight and that takes dynamic changes into account is the following. 
(4.2) I f  a  s t a t e ' s  q u o t a  i n c r e a s e s  t h e n  i t s  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  
d o e s  n o t  d e c r e a s e .  
This notion is called s t r o n g  p o p u l a t i o n  m o n o t o n i c i t y .  Unfortu- 
nately it is too strong. 
Theorem 4 . 1 .  For s 2 - 3 and h # 0, h # s, no p a r t i a l  me thod  
s a t i s f i e s  s t r o n g  p o p u l a t i o n  m o n o t o n i c i t y .  
* 
Given M , the minimum number of seats a state ever gets over 
- 
all populations p is denoted by a, the maximum number by a .  For 
- 
many (but not all) methods a = 0 and = h (see Proposition 4.2 below). 
Proof  o f  Theorem 4 . 1 .  Fix s 2 - 3 and h different from 0 and s and 
* 
suppose that M is strongly population monotone. By homogeneity 
* 
it suffices to restrict M (p) to the set of populations p whose 
- - 
sum is h, i.e. to the quotas. 
If h = 1, (1,0,. . . ,0) is an apportionment for (l/s,l/s, . . . , l/s) . 
It follows that whenever pi > l/s then a. > 1. But then for any 
1 = 
small enough E > 0 p = ((I+E)/s, (l+~)/s, (1-2~)/s,l/s,. . . ,l/s) EF 
- 
* 
- - 
> 1 which implies and for any apportionment a E M  (p) al 2 1. a2 = 
h 2 2, a contradiction. 
- 
Next suppose that 1 < h < s. Consider any PEP such that 
.. 
PI > P2 > o w -  > Ps and h/s < pi < h/(s-1) for i = 1, .... h-1 while 
* 
Ph < h/s. Every apportionment a - E M  (p) - must satisfy al 2 a2 2 . .  .las. - 
Choose rational E > 0 small enough such that pl + E < h/(s-1) 
and let p' = (pl+~,...,pl 
- 
+~,pk) EP where p: < h/s. Each of the 
first s - 1  states gets at least al seats for any apportionment 
* 
b E M  (p' ) . ~ h u s  h = lb. 2 al (s-1 ) , which is a contradiction unless 
- - 1 - 
h = s-1 and a = 1 . We may conclude that al = 1 whenever El is 1 
arbitrarily close to h/(s-1) = 1 and a = 0 whenever ps is arbi- 
S 
trarily close to h/s. But then (1 - (s-1) E, (h-1 )/(s-1) + E, . . . , 
(h-l)/s-1 +E) has apportionment (1,0, ..., 0) which sums to 1 < h, 
a contradiction. 
Finally consider the case h > s. By weak proportionality, 
- 
a = 0 or 1, and a ?  - h - s + 12 - 2. Define the sets 
* 
P- = {pE (0.h) :al = a whenever a € M  (p) and pl = p) I a - - 
* 
Pg = {pE (O,h):al = ; whenever  EM (p) and pl = p) 
- - 
* - 
By definition of a there is a PEP amd a E M  (p) with al = a 
- - - 
hence PEP- for every 0 < p < p 
a i ' Moreover for any PEP- and a 
0 < p' < p, p' €PI Therefore Pa is an interval such that 
gPb(P--) = 0, lub (Pa) = 9 > 0. Similarly P= is an interval with 
a 
- 
lub (P=) = q < h, gRb(P=) = h. 
a a 
Choose rational E > 0 such that E < q and (s-1) E +; < h. 
By definition of q and G I  p' = (h - (s-~)E,E,E,...,E) has the 
- 
- 
- -  - 
- 
unique apportionment . . . ) .  Hence a + (s-l)a = h. Letting 
E approach q from below, the inequality (s-1) E + 5 h must always 
- 
be satisfied, since otherwise state 1 would receive fewer than 
; seats while all the others receive a. Therefore (s-l)q + 6 - < h. 
- 
- 
Hence (c+y,q,. . ,q) E P  for some y 2 0. Define p" = (t+Y + (s-2) 6 
.. 2 ,  
(s-2) 6 - - - - - + , p-6,. . . ,q-6) EP. p" has apportionment a = (b,a2 .a,.. . ,a )  
- 
where a2 > HI a contradiction since then la > h. i 
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 1 .  There exist counterexamples to the theorem when 
h = 0 and h = s. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 2 .  Weak proportionality implies a = 0 or 1. 
A more satisfactory and natural approach to population mono- 
tonicity is to consider the r e l a t i v e  c h a n g e s  in the population of 
different states, and require that if state i's population in- 
creases r e l a t i v e  t o  j's then i should not get less seats and j 
* 
more (unless there is a tie). More exactly, a partial method M 
is p o p u l a t i o n  monotone  if for every two s-vectors p, p' > 0 and 
- -- - 
* 
corresponding M -apportionments a and a', and for all i < j, 
- - 
I a! > a or a' < a., i =  i I = =  I (4.3) p;/p; 2 pi/pj implies or P;/P~ = pi/pj and aj,a! can be sub- 3 
stituted for ai,aj in 3.  
* 
A partial method M is a p a r t i a l  d i v i s o r  method if for some 
monotone increasing function d (a) 
Note that d(a) may not be a divisor criterion in the strict 
sense, since it is not assumed to satisfy a 5 - d(a) 5 - a+l. 
* 
Theorem 4.2. Let h 2 - s 2 2, s # 3. The partial method M is a 
population monotone method if and only if it is 
a partial divisor method for (s,h). 
Proposition 4.3. Every partial divisor method is population 
monotone, even when s = 3. 
The proof of the converse in the case s = 2 is relatively 
simple and intuitive. Fix h - > s = 2. Given a population mono- 
- 
* 
tone method M we shall show the existence of a monotone in- 
creasing function d(a) such that for every p = (p1,p2) > 0, 
- - 
* 
a = (al.a2 ) E M  (p) if and only if al,a2 2 0, al + a  = h, and 
- - 2 
min pi/d (ai - 1 ) 2 - max pi/d (ai) . 
a.>O a.>O 
1 1' 
Equivalently, 
(4.6) p1/p2 = < d(O)/d(h-1) if al = 0, a 2 = h  , 
and 
( 4 . 7 )  d(h-l)/d(O) 5 - p1/p2 i f a l = h ,  a 2 = O  . 
Let P be the set of normalized populations P = {p >O:pl+p2=h), 
- - 
> 0 a + a = h, let P(a) be the set of pop- and for each al,a2 = 1 2 - 
* 
ulations p € F  such that a E M  (p). By population monotonicity, 
- - - 
each P(a) is an interval of the line P. By weak proportionality, 
- 
aEF(a) whenever a > 0. Moreover, since a is the unique appor- 
- - - - - 
tionment when p = a > 0, completeness implies that a is in the 
- - - - 
interior of the interval P(a). Com?leteness also implies that 
- 
P (a) is a closed interval whenever a . 1 ; the intervals P(l, h-1 
- - - 
and P(h-1,l) are either closed or half-open; and the P(0,h) 
and P(h,O) are either half-open (since zero populations are not 
admitted) or empty. Finally, the intervals can overlap only at 
their endpoints, since otherwise population monotonicity would 
be violated. Thus the situation is like that shown in Figure 4.1 
for the case h = 6. 
Figure 4.1 Intervals Defining a Population Monotone 
Partial Method on Two States 
To define the divisor criterion d(a) , simply let (d(al - I ) ,  
d(a2) ) be the left-hand endpoint of the interval F(al ,a2) and 
(d(al) ,d(a2 - 1)) the right-hand endpoint, for all al 2 a2 > 0, 
a + a = h. This defines d(a) for 0 ( a ( h, and d(a) is evi- 1 2 - - 
dently monotone increasing in a. In fact d(a) also satisfies 
a - <d(a) < a+l. 
- - 
For the case s = 3 the result does not hold, as will be 
shown presently by a counterexample. 
For the case s - 4, several definitions and lemmas are needed. 
* 
For every a - 2 - 0, - lai = h, let P(a) - = {p > O  : a E M  (p)). 
- - - - 
Lemma 4.1. P(a) is convex. 
- 
proof. Let p,p'~P(a) but suppose that p = hp + (l-X)p16!!P(a) 
- - - - - 
* 
for some A, 0 < X < 1. Let  EM (p) differ from a in a minimal 
- - - 
number of coordinates. By hypothesis a f a, so choose i f j with 
- - 
- 
a < a i , a  i j I. j By population monotonicity pi/p < Ei/Fj; the 
inequality is strict since otherwise ai,a could be substituted 
- - 
j 
into a - for ai,aj, co~tradicting minimality. 
Similarly, pj/p; < Pi/Pj Thus 
hpi < X(Pi/Pj)pj , 
a contradiction. Hence P(a) is convex. 
- 
As before let a be the minimum number of seats any state 
receives and the maximum number over all populations p and 
- 
* * * 
Lemma 4.2. There exists p > 0 such thct p has a n  M - 
- - - 
- 
-  
apportionment of form (a,a,a3,. . . ,as) . 
* 
Proof. Choose some p'having - an M -apportionment of form a - = 
* (a, a2, . . . ,as) and p" having an M -apportionment of form b = 
- - 
- 
b , , b  3f...,bs). Choose a sufficiently large that ap;/pi >p"/pM 
* 
2 j 
* * for 1 5 - j 2 s and let p = p , a p , . . p .  For every c E M  (p ) 
., - - 
- 
population monotonicity implies that C ~ ~ L  - a2, c1 = a and c < a 
S 
- 
1 -  j 
for j - > 3. If c2 < ; then since lci = lbi and bl 2 cl = a there 
1 
- 
1 
exists j 2 3 with b < c j j' j j Thus b2 = a > c and b < c but 2 
* * 
p2/pj > pi/p'!, contradicting population monotonicity. Therefore 
- * 
c = a and p has the desired property. 2 - 
* 
This particular p will be used in the proof of the finallemma. 
- 
* 
A partial method M may admit several different apportion- 
ments for a fixed population. When this occurs the subset of 
states T which receive different numbers of seats in different 
apportionments are said to be tied. Fix p > 0 and for each i 
- 
* 
let Zi(p) - = min ai over all a - EM (p). - 
* 
Lemma 4.3. If M* is popuzation monotone, t h e n  M (p) - = 
- {a - > 0 : lai = h and ai = ai (p) for all i & T (p) 
.., - -  - - 
- 
a i = ai ( P I  or gi (p) - + 1 for all i E T (p) .., } . 
- - 
Proof. Fix p > 0 and let T = T (p) , ai = ai (p) be as defined 
.., - - - 
* 
above. Choose an arbitrary apportionment & - E M (p) - and fix it 
for the remainder of the argument. For distinct i, j E T  write 
* i + j  if there is some a E M  (p) for which ai < 8 a > 2 
- - i' j 1 BY 
h population monotonicity, ai + a = 2 + 2 and (al,...fai,..., j i j 
* 
a E M  (p). That is i + j  means that an alternate appor- j - 
tionment to 2 - can be found by "switching" some number of seats 
from i to j. 
(4.8) If i + j, k + II a n d  i R, then i + R; moreover in 
each c a s e  t h e  same number of seats a r e  switched. 
~f i = k or j = .t the result is trivial. Otherwise, suppose 
that i < j L_ k < II. Since k+II there exists an apportionment of 
A A * form b = (sl .. . . .ak-B, .. . +B, . . . ,Cs) E M  (p) . Since i + j there 
- 
- 
* is some a EM (p) such that ai < P and a > 2 
- - i j j It follows that 
ai.aj may be substituted into b - to obtain (81,....aiI. 
A * A 
* g r a j r * * * r  
ae+B. ... ) E M  (p). Thus i-II and ai + f,+$ = ai + at. SO i and 
'as - 
II also switch B seats. 
Since for every i E T  there must exist some j E T  with i + j  
or j +if T may be partitioned into two classses A and B such that 
i - j  for every i E A  and j EB. Moreover every switch involves 
exactly seats, B 2 1. If B = 1 the characterization of the 
lemma follows immediately. The proof is completed by showing 
that B 2 - 2 leads to a contradiction. We consider two cases: 
A > 1 for all i. Case 1 ai = 
A A 
Let i - j  and consider the s-tuple c = (~l.....ai-l,....a.+l. 
., 3 
... . .SS) > 0. where 2 -1 > f 
- i - B  1 - 0. By hypothesis c 1 0, so by i - - - 
* * c. 
weak proportionality M (c) - = ici. - Now i - E M  ( p )  - and (il.. . . .ai-@, 
A A * 
.... a + B . .  . . ) E M  (p), hence by population monotonicity ci/c = j I as - j 
A A * pi/pj. ~ut.then (2 .ai-8.....aj+8.....8,) is also an M - 
apportionment for c ,  contradicting weak proportionality. 
- 
h Case 2 a = 0 for some j. j 
Let p be smallest for all j such that 2 = 0. If j @TI j j 
increase p (always staying in the set ~ ( 2 ) )  until at some pointp' j - - 
j enters the tied class. This must eventually happen because 
a = 0 cannot hold when j is the largest state. j M* ( p )  5 M* (PI 
because the populations of all tied states stayed the same. There- 
A A A * fore for some i. (al ..... ai-6. .... 8.+B ..... as) EM (PI). where 3 - 
i -1 > Ci-8 0. If Bk 2 1 for all k t i,j, then by weak pro- i 
,-. h 
portionality c = (a ll...Ii -l,...,a.+l,...,i ) is the unique 
- i 3 s 
* 
M -apportionment when p = c, and a contradiction is obtained by 
- - 
h 
comparing p and c as in the preceding case. If ak = 0 for some 
- - 
k 4 j then by choice of j, k must also be in T. Hence there 
* 
exist a, a'EM (p') such that a = 0, ak = 6, aj = 0 ,  a); = 0. 
- - - j 
* 
But by weak proportionality there is an M -apportionment a" of 
- 
form a'! = a" = 
k 1 (this uses the assumption that h 2 s). A contra- 3 -
diction is obtained as before by comparing p and a". 
- - 
* 
If S is a subset of tied states at M (p) and each state in 
- 
S gets either ai or a.+l seats at p we say (pS;aS) is a t i e  and 1 - - 
write t (pS:aS) . In particular if t (pl ,p2;al , a2) in some problem 
- 
* 
p then by the preceding lemma p has M -apportionments of form 
- - 
(al+l,a2,b3,...,bs) and (al.a2+l,b3, .... bs). Define it to be the 
* 
set of all pairs (a,b) that occur in an M -apportionment for 
some p. 
- 
- 
Lemma 4 . 4 .  If (a,b) EIl and a > 1, a > b 2 1, t h e r .  t h e r e  
- - 
e z i s t  pl,p",p"' > 0 such t h a t  t(p',p",pl"; a,a-1 ,b) . 
P r o o f .  The first step-is to find some p with an apportionment 
- 
- 
of form a = (a,a,b,c~. .... cs). 
- 
If a = 1 choose a. > 1 for all i and let p = a. 
1 = - - 
Suppose that a = 0. Since (a,b) E X  there is some apportion- 
ment b with bi = a > 0, 
bj = b > 0. If some bk = 0 (k i.j) - 
then a permutation of b yields the desired a. Otherwise bk 2 1 
- - - 
* for all k and by weak proportionality there exists an M -appor- 
tionment of form a' = (l,a,b ,...) 2 (1,1 ,...,I). NOW ( l I I I I I . - . I  
- - 
h-s+l) is an apportionment by weak proportionality, hence 
- 
a 2 - h-s+l. Since a > 1 and b 2 1 ,  there exists k 4 such that 
- - 
Beginning w i t h  p '  = a '  E  P  ( a ' )  , d e c r e a s e  p i  a lways  s t a y i n g  
- - - 
i n  P ( a l )  u n t i l  a  p o i n t  p"  E P ( a l )  i s  reached  f o r  which 1  + j f o r  
- - ... 
some j .  Such a  p o i n t  e x i s t s  because  i f  p i  were d e c r e a s e d  u n t i l  
* * * 
P ; / P ~  < P1/pk. where p  - i s  t h e  v e c t o r  of  Lemma 4 .2  t h e n  s t a t e  1  
would g e t  a = 0  s e a t s .  I f  j 2 - 4 t h e n  a n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t  o f  t h e  
d e s i r e d  form ( O , a , b ,  ... ) e x i s t s  f o r  p" .  
- 
I f  j = 2 o r  3 ,  b e g i n  a t  p"  and d e c r e a s e  s t a t e s  1 ,  2 ,  3 pro-  
- 
* 
p o r t i o n a l l y  (by a  common f a c t o r  a) u n t i l  a  p o i n t  pV''EM ( a ' )  i s  
- - 
reached  f o r  which i + R ,  i 5 - 3 ,  R 2 4 .  Such a  p o i n t  e x i s t s  by 
- 
- 
v i r t u e  o f  Lemma 2 and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a); < a .  By Lemma 3 ,  1 + I ,  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h a t  a n  appor t ionment  o f  form ( O , a , b ,  ... ) e x i s t s  
f o r  p"' . 
- 
* 
L e t  t h e n  a  = ( a , a , b , c 4 . .  . . ,cs)  and choose  an-1 p  E M  ( a )  . 
- - - 
L e t  TI c o n s i s t  o f  s t a t e  2  and a l l  o t h e r  s t a t e s  ( i f  any) t i e d  
w i t h  s t a t e  2 a t  p.  Beginning a t  p ,  d e c r e a s e  a l l  s t a t e s  i n  TI 
- - 
1  * p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  u n t i l  a t  some p o i n t  p  E M  ( a )  , 2 + j f o r  some 
- - 
1  j 6 T 1 .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t p  -  let^^$^^ b e t h e  c l a s s  of  t i e d  s t a t e s .  
Decrease  a l l  s t a t e s  i n  T2 p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  u n t i l  t h e  t i e d  c l a s s  
2 
a g a i n  i n c r e a s e s  a t  p o i n t  p  , etc .  The p r o c e s s  t e r m i n a t e s  a t  some 
- 
pn ,  where a l l  s t a t e s  s a t i s f y i n g  a  < a r e  t i e d .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
- i 
s t a t e s  1 and 3  a r e  t i e d  a t  pn. I t  f o l l o w s  from Imnma 4 . 2  
- 
t h a t  
The i d e a  of  t h e  proof  of  Theorem 4.2 i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  I f  
i n  some problem a  s t a t e  hav ing  a s e a t s  i s  t i e d  w i t h  a  s t a t e  having 
a  s e a t s ,  i . e .  i f  t ( p , p ; a , a ) ,  d e f i n e  d ( a )  = p/p.  d ( a )  i s  w e l l -  
- 
d e f i n e d  because  i f  a l s o  t ( p l , p ' ; a , a )  t h e n  p o p u l a t i o n  monoton- 
icity implies that p/p = p'/p'. It is an easy exercise to show 
that if d (a) and d (b) are defined then a > b implies d (a) > d (b) , 
i.e. d is monotone increasing. 
* 
Now let a E M  (p) and choose any i f j for which > a > 1 
- ." 
- i 
- 
and z > aj 2 1. By Lemma 4.4 t(p',pl',p"';a,ai-1,a) for some j 
* 
pl,p",p"' > 0. Comparing this with the apportionment a E M  - (p), 
- 
it follows from population monotonicity that pW/p"' - 5 pi/pj. But 
p"'/pl = d(a.) and pW/p' = d(ai-1) whence d(ai-l)/d(aj) 2 pi/pj 3 
and 
- 
It remains to show (4.10) when a = and/or ai = 1 . Now j 
d(z) has not yet been defined, hence set d (z) = a, and (4.10) holds. 
If ai = 1 there are two cases to consider. In case a = 0 then 
d (0) is defined and equals 1, so (4.10) says that p ./pi 3 = < d(aj), 
which is an immediate consequence of the definition of d(a.) and 3 
population monotonicity. Otherwise a = 1 and d(0) is not yet 
defined. In this case set d(0) = 0 and again (4.10) holds. Thus 
(4.10) holds in every case. Therefore, since d (ai) > d (ai-1 ) for 
all i we can write 
* (4.11) a E M  (p) implies min pi/d (ai-1 1 max pi/d(ai) . 
- - 
- 
a.>O a.>O 
1 1= 
Conversely let a satisfy (4.11) for some p. Since d(a) is 
- - 
strictly monotone increasing, p may be wiggled slightly to obtain 
- 
some p' such that the min max inequality holds strictly. For 
- 
such a p' - the only apportionment satisfying the inequality is a, - 
so by (4.11) a is the unique apportionment for p'. Now construct 
." - 
a sequence of such p' converging to p and conclude by completeness 
- - 
* 
that a E M  (p) . 0 
- - 
The theorem fails when there are only three states. The 
reason is that the proof depends on constructing a sufficiently 
rich collection of 3-way ties, which cannot be done when there 
is no fourth state to take up the slack. In general, let 
e(a,al) = p/pl if t(p,p';a,al); thus e(a,al) is the ratio at 
which a state having a+l seats would first give up a seat to a 
state having a' seats as the former decreases and the latter 
* 
increases in population. If M is a partial divisor method then 
e (a,a9) = d (a) /d (a' ) and the following multiplicative rule must 
hold among all pairs on which e is defined: 
Conversely, if (4.12) holds we can define d (a) = e(a,a) 
and immediately derive the min max inequality from population 
monotonicity. 
(4.12) can be established by constructing 3-way ties of 
form t(pl,p",p"'; al,a",a"' ) as in Lemma 4.4, but for fixed h the 
construction only works if there is at least one more state to 
absorb the other seats. 
To illustrate what can go wrong when s = 3, consider the 
case h = 7. A 3-way tie will involve either one or two seats 
being shifted around. Hence t(p:a) means that lai = 5 or lai = 6 
- - 
so there are (up to order) the following ten possibilities for a: 
- 
Each o f  t h e s e  t e n  t r i p l e s  p roduces  o n e  dependency i n  t h e  
v a r i a b l e s  e ( a ,  b )  o f  t h e  form (4 .12)  . A l s o  w e  must  have e ( b , a )  = 
l / e ( a , b )  and e ( a , a )  = 1 .  Now choose  e ( a , O )  = 2a+l a s  i n  W e b s t e r ' s  
method. The t e n  d e p e n d e n c i e s  a r e  r e d u n d a n t  and o n l y  d e t e r m i n e  
f o u r  a d d i t i o n a l  v a l u e s :  
There  remain  e ( 1 , 2 )  and e ( 1 , 3 )  , which a r e  r e l a t e d  by t h e  
e x p r e s s i o n  e ( 1 , 3 )  = e ( 1 , 2 ) e ( 2 , 3 )  = 5 e ( 1 , 2 ) / 7 .  To be  a  d i v i s o r  
method e ( 1 , 2 )  must  a l s o  s a t i s f y  e ( 1 , 2 )  = e ( 1 , O )  e ( 0 , 2 )  = 3 / 5 .  ~ u t  
f o r  h  = 7 ,  t h e  t r i p l e  ( 0 , 1  , 2 )  does  n o t  o c c u r  a s  a  t i e ,  so no s u c h  
dependency i s  imposed. I n  f a c t  i f  e ( 1 , 2 )  i s  chosen  c l o s e  t o  b u t  
* 
n o t  e q u a l  t o  3/5 t h e n  M w i l l  be p o p u l a t i o n  monotone b u t  n o t  a  
d i v i s o r  method. An example w i t h  e ( 1 , 2 )  = 4/5 i s  shown i n  
F i g u r e  4.1. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 4 .  For  s = 3 and 3  5 - h  5 - 6 ,  e v e r y  p o p u l a t i o n  
monotone p a r t i a l  method i s  a  p a r t i a l  d i v i s o r  method. 
* 
Prcpocitior 4.5 If 1 < h < s, define EI such that the largest state al- 
* 
ways gets h seats and the rest get zero seats. b l  is population 
monotone but technically is not a partial divisor method, be- 
cause it cannot be represented by a monotone increasing d(a). 
Pmpocition 3.6 Theorem 4.2 also holds in the case of arbitrary min- 
imum requirements r and h 2 max (s,lri) s ) 3. Modify the 
- - 
proof by first defining bi and bi to be the minimum and maximum 
* 
apportionments ever received by state i among all a E M  ( p ) ,  and 
- - 
then proving the analog of Lemma 4.3. To establish the analog 
of Lemma 4.4 suppose without loss of generality that state 1 
has the smallest sit and state 2 the next smallest. Show that 
* - if a E M  (p) and Zi 2 ai > max {ai,l), a > a. > max {a ,1), 
- - j I = 
- 
j 
1 ,  2, then a 3-way tie of form t(p',p",p"';al,ai-1.a ) j 
can be constructed. If t (p,p;al ,a) define d(a) = p/p. 
This defines d (a) for all relevant a,g > a - bZ. For bl < a < a2 
- 
construct a tie of form t(p,p1;a,a2) and define d(a) = 
- 
(p/p1)d(a2). Finally, let d(a) = = and d(0) = 0 if bl > rl = 0.  
Now check the well-definition of d(a) and show that the min 
max inequality follows from population monotonicity. 
+ 
Ppopoeitiorz 6.7 For qiven minimum a ~ d  maximum requirements r 5 - r 
Theorem b.2 may fail even when s 2 - 4. 
Suppose that M is a method such that every restriction to 
some fixed s and h is population monotone. By Theorem 4.2, every 
such restriction is a partial divisor method; however the associ- 
ated functions d(a) may depend on s and h. For example, M might 
be Adams' method when h-s is odd and Jefferson's when h-s is even. 
Of course, such a method is ridiculous, since it does not give 
F i g u r e  4 . 2  A P o p u l a t i o n  Monotone P a r t i a l  Method on  
T h r e e  S t a t e s  t h a t  i s  N o t  a D i v i s o r  Method 
consistent results when the house size or number of states 
changes. Such absurdities are avoided by extending the concept 
of population monotonicity to allow comparisons between any two 
problems, including ones with different s and h. 
A method M is p o p u l a t i o n  monotone if for any two vectors p, 
- 
p' > 0 and a€M(p,h), a' €M(pl,h') 
- - ... - - - 
> pi/pj implies 1 (4.13) pj1/p; I = 
can be substituted for ai,a in a. j ... 
Theorem 4 . 3 .  A method i s  p o p u l a t i o n  monotone i f  and o n l y  i f  
i t  i s  a  d i v i s o r  method.  
C o r o l l a r y  4 . 3 . 1  I f  a  method i s  p o p u l a t i o n  monotone t h e n  i t  i s  
house monotone.  
Theorem 4.3 is proved by showing that a single divisor 
criterion applies to all 2-state problems (use Theorem 4.2) and 
then showing that the same divisor applies to all problems, in- 
cluding those with s = 3. The theorem still holds when (4.13) 
is modified to allow for minimum and maximum requirements. 
Population monotonicity says that as the conditions of a 
problem change --as populations shift, as the size of house ex- 
pands or contracts, and states join or secede --apportionments 
should respond accordingly, i.e., they should not move contrary 
to the relative changes of states' populations. This is an 
elementary requirement for any scheme of fair representation, 
and the only methods that satisfy it are the divisor methods. 
It is significant that other fairness ideas follow automatic- 
ally. Any method that is population monotone avoids the Alabama 
paradox. Another fairness concept implied by population monoton- 
icity is "uniformity", which says (roughly) that any apportion- 
ment should still be valid when restricted to any subgroup of 
states. This concept is treated in more detail in Section 8. 
5. BIAS 
The decisive conclusion of the preceding section is that the 
only realistic candidates for methods of apportionment are the 
divisor methods. The question then becomes: which of the infi- 
nite number of divisor methods should be chosen? 
Historical precedent --both the debate of 1832 and the twen- 
tieth century controversy over the methods of Hill and Webster -- 
is that a method is unacceptable if it has a persistent bias either 
in favor of the large or of the small states. There are several 
ways to measure "bias", and there are different probabilistic 
models by which a tendency toward bias can be revealed theoretic- 
ally. While no one particular definition or model provides ab- 
solute proof that a method is biased or not, the weight of the 
evidence over a variety of definitions and models is persuasive 
that Webster's is the only divisor method that is unbiased. Anal- 
ysis of the historical statistics confirms the theory with ex- 
perimental fact. 
Even a casual inspection of the five "traditional" methods 
applied to examples shows that in the order Adams ( A ) ,  Dean (Dl, 
Hill (H), Webster (W), and Jefferson (J), they tend increasingly 
to favor the larger states. This is revealed in Example 1.1 as 
well as in the more convincing 19 examples of U.S. history. 
This observation may be made precise. A method M' f a v o r s  s m a l l  
s t a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  M if, for every M-apportionment a and 
- 
ti'-apportionment a' for p and h, 
- - 
pi < pj implies either a: 2 ai or a! < a  I =  j 
Theorem 5 . 1 .  I f  M and M' a r e  d i v i s o r  methods w i t h  d i v i s o r  
c r i t e r i a  d ( a )  and d '  (a)  s a t i s f y i n g  d '  ( a ) / d '  ( b )  > 
d ( a ) / d ( b )  for  a l l  i n t e g e r s  a > b 2 0, then M '  
favors  smal l  s t a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  M. 
Proof o f  Theorem 5 . 1 .  Suppose by way of  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  f o r  
some aEM(p ,h )  and a '  E M t ( p , h ) ,  pi < p j ,  a j  < ai. and a! > a 
- . - - 3 j '  
By popu la t ion  monotonic i ty  a j  < ai  2 a < a!, s o  a '  - 1  > a j  2 0 j 3 j - 
and d ( a !  - 1 )  2 1 because a 2 d ( a )  2 a+l f o r  a l l  a. 
3 
The min-max i n e q u a l i t y  f o r  a '  - i m p l i e s  p  . /dl ( a '  - 1 ) 2; 3 j 
pi/dl ( a j )  from which, by t h e  preceding.  it fo l lows  t h a t  d '  (a:) > 0. 
Hence, 
t h e  l a s t  by monotonic i ty  of  d  (a)  . Thus. p  . /d  ( a j )  > pi/d (ai - 1 ) , 3 
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  min-max i n e q u a l i t y  f o r  a. 
- 
Write M' > M i f  M '  f a v o r s  sma l l  s t a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  M .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  5 . 1 .  A > D > H > W > J . 
Bias  has ,  however, an  a b s o l u t e  a s  w e l l  a s  a  r e l a t i v e  meaning. 
Any apportionment t h a t  g i v e s  a l  and a 2  s e a t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  s t a t e s  
having popu la t ions  p l  > p2 > 0 favors  t h e  l a r g e r  s t a t e  over  t h e  
s m a l l e r  s t a t e  i f  a l / p l  > a2/p2 and favors  t h e  s m a t t e r  s t a t e  o v e r  
t h e  l a r g e r  s t a t e  if a l / p l  < a2/p2. It  may be asked whether over  
many p a i r s  of s t a t e s  a method t e n d s  more o f t e n  t o  f avo r  t h e  l a r g e r  
over  t h e  smaller s t a t e  o r  v i c e  v e r s a .  
D i f f e r e n t  meanings may b e  a t t a c h e d  t o  "many p a i r s " .  One 
s imple  approach i s  t o  c o n s i d e r  a  p a i r  of p o p u l a t i o n s  p l  > p2 > 0. 
Two states having these populations could divide any number of 
seats h between them and, since we are considering only divisor 
methods, the way in which they would share h seats is determined 
independently of any other states that may be part of the same 
problem. Since pl and p2 are rational (or integer) there is a 
* 
smallest "perfect" house size h where both states have integer 
quotas. A reasonable idea then is to count, for any method M 
and pair of populations (p1,p2 ) , the number S (pl , p2 ) of appor- 
tionments favoring the smaller state and the number L(p1,p2) of 
apportionments favoring the larger state, over all M-apportion- 
* 
ments (al,a2) such that al + a2 5 h . The method M is pairwise 
u n b i a s e d  o n  p o ~ v l a t i o n s  if for every pair of populations (p1,p2), 
Proposition 5.2. Webster's is the only divisor method that is 
pairwise unbiased on populations. 
This approach to defining and measuring bias has the merit 
that no assumption need be made about the distribution of pop- 
ulations: whatever the pair of populations, Webster's is the 
unique unbiased divisor method. However, as an empirical test 
the approach has limitations, for the number of seats shared by 
* 
a pair of states will typically be much smaller than h . 
A more realistic approach is to consider a pair of integer 
apportionments a 1 > a2 > 0 and ask: if the populations (p1,p2) 
have the M-apportionment (alfa2 ) how likely is it that the small 
state (state 2) is favored? Note that the population monotonicity 
of !? guarantees pl 2 p2 since a > a 1 2 ' 
Take as a probabilistic model that the populations (p1,p2) = 
> 0 are uniformly distributed in the positive quadrant. Given P - 
integers a = (al ,a2 
-# 
) > 0 and a method M, the set of p's for which 
- - 
a is an M-apportionment is unbounded. To define a bounded sub- 
- 
set of the sample space in a natural way we use the fact that M 
is a divisor method. 
Choose any x > 0 representing a hypothetical district size, 
let a > 0 be an apportionment, and define Rx(a) to be the set of 
- -# - 
all populations p > 0 which yield the M-apportionment a using the 
-# -# -# 
divisor x: 
where by convention d(-1) = 0. Each region Rx(a) is a rectangle 
-# 
containing the point a and having sides of length d(al) - d(al-1) 
- 
and d(a2) - d(a2-1). Figure 5.1 shows these for Dean's method, 
and Figure 5.2 for Webster's (x = 1 in both cases) . 
Figure 5.3 shows them for the somewhat bizarre' divisor method 
that is defined as follows: 
A divisor method M is pairwise unbiased o n  apportionments 
if for every al > a > 0 and every x > 0 the probability that 2 
state 1 is favored over state 2 equals the probability that state 2 
is favored over state 1, given that (pl ,p2) ERx (a). Note that 
-# 
the probability that one state is favored over the other is in- 
dependent of the choice of x, so that if a method satisfies the 
definition for some x then it does for all x. 
F i g u r e  5.1  Regions Favor ing  Small  and Large  S t a t e s  -- 
Dean ' s Method 
Figure 5.2 Regions Favoring Small and Large States -- 
Webster's Method 
Figure 5.3 Regions Favoring Small and Large States -- 
A Yon-Proportional Method 

For each pair al > a > 0 the shaded area in the figures 2 
show those populations that favor the smaller state. It is quite 
evident that Dean's method is systematically biased toward smaller 
states, whereas both Webster's method and the "1/5 -4/5" method 
are unbiased. However the latter method is a strange one; in- 
deed it is not proportional. For example if the populations are 
in the ratio represented by the ray OAB, they will split 6 seats 
as 3 and 3, but 4 seats as 3 and 1. Such methods are not reason- 
able, since they do not adhere to the ideal of allocating seats 
in proportion to numbers as near as may be. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  5.3. The theoretical model developed above may be 
-- 
used to compute the probability that the small state is favored 
for each of the five traditional methods, for any given ap- 
portionment (e.g., (4 -2) ) . 
T h e o r e m  5.2. Webster's is t h e  u n i q u e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  d i v i s o r  
m e t h o d  t h a t  is pairwise u n b i a s e d  o n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s .  
Proof of T h e o r e m  5.2. Given a divisor method M and a > a > 0, 1 2 
the ray defined by al/pl = a2/p2 divides Rx(a) into the popula- 
- 
tions favoring state 1 and those favoring state 2. These two 
sets have equal measure, i.e., the ray bisects the rectangle, 
if and only if it passes through its center, c = (c 
- , c2) . Since 
M is pairwise unbiased if and only if it satisfies the following 
condition: 
d(al-1) + d(al) a 
(5.1) - - for all al > a > 0 . 
d (a2-1 + d (a2) a 2 2 
In particular, W is palrwise unbiased on apportionments. 
Conversely, suppose that M satisfies (5.1). Set al = a 2 - 2, 
a = 1. Then 2 
and, since a 2 d(a) - a + 1 for all a, letting a + a) implies 
From the two preceding relations it follows that 
(5.2) d(2a) = 2a + d(0) and d(2a+l) = 2a + 2 - d(0) . 
Proposition 5.4. Proportionality implies that 
(5.3) d(b)/d(b-1) 2 d(b+l)/d (b) for all b > 0 . 
Substituting b = 2a + 1 and using (5.2) gives 
or 4a + 4 2 (8a + 6) d (0) . Letting a + shows that d (0) 5 - 1/2. 
Substituting instead b = 2a into (5.3) we find (8a + 2)d(0) 2 - 4a 
and so d (0) 1 1/2. Therefore d (0) = 1/2 and we see that M is 
- 
Webster's method. 
Other probabilistic models of pairwise bias point to the 
same conclusion. For example, one might assume that all normat- 
ized poputations pl + p2 = 1 are equally likely. Given a divisor 
method M, the populations for which some particular M-apportionment 
(al,a2). al > a ? 0, is the solution for h can be repre- 2 
sented as a line segment. It is convenient to renormalize 
so that pl + p2 = h: then (al,a2) itself is contained in 
the segment, and the smaller state is favored in the part of 
segment lying to the right of (alla2). Thus in this model M will 
be pairwise unbiased on apportionments if, for every a > a > 0, 1 2 
(al,a ) is the midpoint of its segment. This is manifestly true 2 
for Webster, and indeed it may be shown that W e b s t e r r s  i s  t h e  
u n i q u e  d i v i s o r  m e t h o d  t h a t  i s  p a i r w i s e  u n b i a s e d  o n  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  
i n  t h i s  m o d e l .  
The proof follows by observing that (al,a2) > 0 is the mid- 
- 
point of its segment if and only if 
With al = a, a = a + l  we obtain the recursion d(a+l) = 2 
(2a+3)d(a-1)/(2a-l), from which 
d(2a) = (4a+l)d(O), and d(2a+l) = (4a/3+l)d(l) . 
Now use 2a 5 d (2a) 5 2a+l and let a + to conclude that d (0) = 
- - 
1/2. Similarly conclude that d(1) = 3/2. Hence d (a) is the 
Webster divisor criterion. Note that only weak proportionality 
was needed to obtain this result. 
The preceding theoretical results suggest the following 
empirical test for bias. Given a divisor method M I  let 9 be a 
collection of 2-state s a m p l e  p r o b l e m s  (p1,p2;al1a2)t where al > 
a > 0 and (al,a ) is an M-apportionment for (plrP2). One way 2 2 
of obtaining such a sample is to select from a larger problem 
(p1,...,pS;al,... ) all pairs i,j such that ai > a > 0 and as j 
consider each such (pi,pj;ai,aj) as a 2-state problem. This ex- 
ploits the fact that divisor methods are "uniform", i.e. the way 
in which a divisor method shares ai + a seats between two states j 
is determined independently of the populations of the other states 
(see Section 8 for a discussion of uniformity). The bias ratio 
is the percentage of pairs (p;a) €.qfor which the small state is 
favored. One would.expect that for sufficiently large samples 
the bias ratio for Webster is close to SOX, whereas the ratio for 
other proportional methods is significantly different from 50%. 
Analysis of United States historical data fulfills this ex- 
pectation. However, the Congressional apportionment problem 
requires that a minimum of one seat be given to each state no 
matter how small its population. This requirement introduces an 
additional built-in favoritism toward the small states. In order 
to analyze the actual apportionments that would have resulted by 
different methods applied to the nineteen historical problems, 
and yet eliminate this "artificial" bias toward the small, each 
method was applied with the minimum requirement of 1, but the 
counts have been made after leaving out all states having a quota 
less than .5. The bias ratio o v e r  U.S .  history for any method M 
was computed by counting, for each census year, the number of 
pairs of states in which the smaller state would have been favored 
by this method and dividing by the total number of pairs over all 
nineteen problems. The results are given in Table 5.1. 
Adams Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
Bias ratio 77.2% 56.6% 54.4% 51.3% 24.7% 
Table 5.1 Bias ratio over U.S. history. 
The theoretical bias results also hold in the presence of 
minimum and maximum requirements. It is natural to ask only that 
a method be unbiased whenever the requirements are not binding. 
If, for example, r = (r r ) is a set of minimum requirements 
- 1" S 
for states with populations p = (pl, ...,p s), then state i is free 
- 
at h using the method M if ai > r for some a €M(p,h), and other- i - - 
wise is bound. This definition parallels the previous analysis 
where r = 0 and the arguments were confined to a > 0. The theorems 
- - ,., - 
and proofs go through with little or no adjustment. 
Problems involving more than two states can also be analyzed 
for bias by comparing how the larger states and smaller states 
fare as groups. Given a possible apportionment a = (al,.,aS)> 0 
- - 
for populations p = (pl,. . . ,ps), let L and S be any two disjoint 
- 
sets of states such that ai > a for every i € L  and j ES. L is j 
a set of larger states and S a set of smaller states. The appor- 
tionment a - > 0 - favors the smaller states if lSai/lSpi > lLaj/lLPj 
and favors t h e  larger states if 1 a./l p > lSai/lSpi. L J  L j  
A divisor method M is unbiased if for every a > 0 and divisor 
- - 
x > 0, and for any disjoint sets of larger and smaller states L 
and S, the probability given p €Rx(a) that (p;a) favors the smaller 
- - - - 
states equals the probability that it favors the larger states. 
Note that the condition holds for some x if and only if it holds 
for all x. 
Theorem 5.3. W e b s t e r r s  is t h e  unique unbiased proportional 
divisor method. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let M be a proportional divisor method. 
Given a > 0 and x > 0, let L and S be any disjoint sets of larger 
.- - 
and smaller states respectively. The hyperplane lai/lpi = lai/Epi 
L L S S 
divides R (a) into the populations favoring L and those favoring S. 
X - 
These two sets have equal measure, i.e., the hyperplane bisects 
the rectangular solid Rx(a), if and only if it passes through the 
- 
center of Rx(a). The center c has coordinates ci = [d(ai-1) + 
- - 
d(a.)]/2; hence M is unbiased if and only if for all a > 0 
1 - - 
Conversely, if M satisfies (5.4) for all a > 0, then, in 
- - 
particular, it satisfies it whenever a = (a+l,a), a >  0. From 
- 
this it may be concluded as in the proof of Theorem 5.2 that M 
is Webster's method. 
Note that if it is desired to argue with the number of 
states s fized, s 2 - 3 then let t = rzi+ 1 and consider instead 2 
the apportionment al = a2 . . .=  a = a+l, at+l - t ...= a =a(a>O). S 
Then (5.4) becomes 
from which it follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.2 that M must 
be Webster's method. 
This model of bias can be used to provide further convincing 
empirical evidence that Webster's is the preferred method. A test 
for a method M is to take the nineteen cases of United States 
history (p;a), where a is an M-apportionment for p, including 
minimum requirements of 1, and for each such problem eliminate 
states with quota less than .5. Divide the remaining states 
into three approximately equal classes: large (L), middle, and 
small (S), where the middle class takes up the extras if the 
number of remaining states is not divisible by three. Counting 
the number of problems in which the small states are favored one 
finds: Adams 19 (always), Dean 14, Hill 12, Webster 7, Jefferson 
0 (never) . 
Considerably more insight is obtained by calculating, for 
each apportionment, the percentage difference B between ks=lSai/ 
k 1 .  IsPi and kL = ILaj/lLpjI that is, B = 100 (kS -kL)/min(kS, 
B is the p e r c e n t a g e  bias of the apportionment: if positive the 
small states are favored, if negative the large states are 
favored. Contrasting the apportionments by each of the five 
traditional methods over the nineteen U.S. censuses, one finds 
that in e v e r y  case the percentage bias of Webster's method is 
smaller in absolute value than that of Hill and, indeed, than 
that of any of the other methods. The average of the percentage 
biases of each method over the nineteen problems is given in 
Table 5.2. A graph of the cumulative average bias of each method 
may be found in Chapter 3 (Figure 5). 
Ad am s Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
Average bias 18.31% 5.19% 3.38% 0.26% -1 8 -78% 
Table 5.2. Average Percentage Bias over 19 U.S. Problems 
This model is also convenient for estimating the probabil- 
ity of bias when the number of states s is large (e.g., s = 50). 
Choose a > 0, let L and S be classes of larger and smaller 
- - 
states respectively, and define aL = lLaj and as = lsai Fix 
x > 0 and let R = Rx(a). The quotients qi = pi/x are distributed 
- 
independently and uniformly in the intervals d(ai-1) 2 qi d(ai). 
The mean mi and variance u of qi are therefore i 
2 
m = (d(ai) + d(ai-1) )/2 and oi = (d(ai) - d(ai-1) ) /12 . i 
Define the random variable X = lSqi - (aS/aL)lLqj, where q - E R. 
X is a sum of independent random variables so its mean and vari- 
ance are given by 
m = Ismi - (as/aL) lLmj and u2 = lsui + (as/aL) 2 lLuj 2 . 
If the number of states in the set L u S  is large, the central 
limit theorem implies that = (X-m)/a is approximately normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. So the probability that 
the small states are favored is Pr (X - 0) = ~r (z - 5-m/u) , which 
is estimated using standard tables of the normal distribution. 
To illustrate, take the a c t u a l  1970 U.S. apportionment (see 
Hill apportionment, 1970). The one-third (i.e., 16) largest 
states have a total of aL = 300 seats, and the one-third (16) 
smallest states have as = 27 seats. I L  us1 = 32, a reasonably 
large sample for using the normal distribution as an approximation. 
To conform with our previous historical analysis we assume no 
quotient can go below .5. For Hill's method we obtain: Ismi = 
2 26.0861, lLmj = 299.8650, lSoi = 1.3075, 1 u2 = 1.3342 so m = 
L j 
-2.4017, 02 = 1.2565, and m/o = -.7886. Therefore Pr(X50) - = 
~r(Xz.7886) - = 78.48%. Thus, the odds that Hill favors the small 
is almost 4 to 1. The results for the five traditional methods 
are given in Table 5.3. 
Adams Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
100 .0% 93.995 78 .5% 5 0 . 0 %  0 .0% 
Table 5 . 3 .  Estimated probability of favoring the small 
states for each of the five methods on the 
basis of the actual 1970  apportionment. 
A similar calculation gives the expected percentage bias 
for each method. Let x = Esqi/as and Y = ELqi/aL. Then E (x/Y)~ 
E (X) /E (Y) + Var (Y) E (X) /E (Y) 3, the approximation corning from the 
first terms of a Taylor expansion. E(X/Y) represents the ex- 
pected ratio by which the large states are overrepresented rel- 
ative to the small. So, the reciprocal minus 1  gives an estimate 
of B .  For Hill's method, using the previous calculations, we 
obtain: 
so B = - 1  + 1 / . 9 6 6 6  = . 0 3 4 6 .  Therefore the expected percentage 
bias in favor of the small by the method of Hill, given the 1 9 7 0  
apportionment, is 3 .46%.  The results for the five traditional 
methods are given in Table 5 .4  
Adams Dean Hill Webster Jefferson 
28 .2% 7 .0% 3 . 5 %  0 .0% -20 .8% 
Table 5 . 4  Expected Percentage Bias of Five Methods 
on the basis of the actual 1 9 7 0  apportionment. 
These expected figures are in remarkably close agreement with 
the actual historical averages of Table 5.2. This is especially 
so since the statistics of U.S. history contain rather peculiar 
dependencies which have to do with the way in which new states 
were admitted to the Union and the choice of house size that was 
made. Had there always been 50 states and 435 seats, one would 
expect the historical bias percentages to be even closer to those 
of Table 5.4. 
Alternative probabilistic models for the joint distribution 
of the populations could certainly be chosen; the fact is that 
no one model is definitive or "most realistic". One obvious 
choice is to assume that all normalized populations lpi = 1 are 
equally likely. In this model it is not possible to prove that 
the Webster method is perfectly unbiased. The difficulty results 
from the integer nature of the problem together with the fact that 
in the normalized model the number of degrees of freedom is re- 
duced by one. In spite of this, any predicted bias of Webster's 
method derivable from such a model is so small as to be empiric- 
ally indistinguishable from the hypothesis of perfect unbias 
when the number of states is large. 
One of the advantages of the probabilistic model we have 
taken is that it can be applied locally, without assuming gross 
changes in the relative populations of the states, Thus a method 
is unbiased only if it is unbiased over e v e r y  set of populations 
that-would yield a pre-specified distribution of seats. Other 
local assumptions may give slightly different numerical results -- 
and may rule out a mathematically perfect method -- but the empir- 
ical result will not change. The agreement between the theory 
and the historical statistics seems conclusive that Webster's 
is the least biased divisor method. 
Proposition 5.5. The statements of each of the Theorems 5.1, 
5.2, and 5.3 may be modified to account for minimum require- 
ments. 
6. STAYING WITHIN THE QUOTA 
It seems extremely natural to require that no state's 
apportionment should deviate from its quota by one or more 
seats; in other words, no state should get less than its quota 
rounded down, nor more than its auota rounded up. This prop- 
perty is called s t a y i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  q u o t a .  The primitive 
desire to stay within the quota clearly motivated Hamilton's 
method and it was a key point in Webster's critique of Jefferson's 
method. Webster's method is closer than any other divisor method 
to the ideal of staying within the quota. Nevertheless, it does 
not invariably stay within the quota,as the invented examples of 
Table 6 show. Such examples turn out to be very rare: in prac- 
tice it is extremely improbable that Webster's method would ever 
violate quota. Moreover these same examples suggest that staying 
within the quota may not be such a reasonable idea after all. 
For example, to give d 26 instead of 25 seats in Table 6 would 
mean taking a seat from one of the smaller states a, b, or c. 
Such a transfer would penalize the per capita representation of 
the small state much more --in both absolute and relative terms -- 
than state d is penalized by getting one less than its lower quota. 
Similar remarks argue for state D getting more than its upper 
quota in the second example in Table 6. It can be argued that 
staying within the quota is not really compatible with the idea 
of proportionality at all, since it allows a much greater variance 
in the per capita representation of smaller states than it does 
for larger states. This basic incompatibility between staying 
within the quota and proportionality is most clearly seen by 
the following "impossibility theorem", which says that no method 
can be population monotone and stay within the quota. 
Theorern 6 . 1  l ' h e r e  e x i s t s  no  p a r t i a l  m e t h o d  w i t h  s .- 2 4 and 
h 2 - s+3 t h a t  i s  p o p u l a t i o n  m o n o t o n e  and s t a y s  
w i t h i n  t h e  q u o t a .  
* 
P r o o f  o f  T h e o r e m  6 . 1 .  Fix s 2 - 4, h 2 - s+3 and suppose M is a 
partial method that is population monotone and stays within the 
quota. Consider the populations p = (5+~,2/3,2/3,2/3-~,b 5,...,bs) 
- 
where b5, ..., b are any p o s i t i v e  integers whose sum is h-7 and 
S 
E > 0 is some small rational number. Since Epi = h, pi is i t s  
* 
exact quota for all i. Choose a EM (p). By the quota assumption, 
-. - 
- a > 5 and ai = bi for all i L 5. Therefore a2 + a3 + a4 - 1 = - 
h-5 - (h-7) = 2, so at least one of states 2, 3, 4 gets 0 seats. 
Now consider the populations p t  = ( 4 - ~ ~ 2 - ~ / 2 , 1 / 2 + ~ / 2 , 1 / 2 + ~ ~  
- 
b5,...,bs). Again lpj = h so pi is the exact quota of i. Choose 
* 
a' - E M  (pt). - By quota, a; 2 4, a; 2 2 and a: = bi for i - > 5. 
Hence either state 3 or state 4 gets one seat. By population 
monotonicity it must be state 4. Therefore a; > a4 while a; < a l  
so by population monotonicity p;/pi < p1/p4, that is (4-€)/ 
(1/2+~) < (5+~)/(2/3-€1. Simplifying this becomes E > 1/61, 
which is false for sufficiently small E. 
C o r o l i a ~ ~ y  6 . 1  iiio p o p u l a t i o n  m o n o t o n e  m e t h o d ,  i .  e .  no  d i v i s o r  
m e t h o d ,  s t a y s  w i t h i n  t h e  q u o t a  f o r  e v e r y  p r o b l e m .  
P r o p c a i S i o , ~  8.17. Every divisor method stays within the quota for 
all two-state problems. 
P r o n o s i t i o n  6 . 2 .  Webster's method stays within the quota for all 
three-state problems. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  6 . 3 .  For any divisor method different from Webster's, 
there is a three-state problem in which the apportionment does 
not stay within the quota. (Let d(a) be a divisor criterion 
different than Webster's and choose a such that d(a) a+1/2. 
Let e = (a+1/2) - d(a) and for every integer b construct the 
problem with populations p = (a+1/2 ,d (a) +e/2, b+l +e/2) and house 
- 
size h = 2a+b+2. For sufficiently large b the answer does not 
stay within the quota.) It follows from this and the preceding 
exercise that Webster's method is the u n i q u e  divisor method 
that stays within the quota for all three-state problems. 
Population monotonicity is consistent with partial ways of 
satisfying quota. M s t a y s  above l o v e r  quo ta  if a. > LqiJ for all 
1 = 
apportionments a and M s t a y s  b e l o v  upper  q u o t a  if ai 2 rqil for 
- 
all a. 
. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  6 . 4 .  Jefferson's method is the unique population 
monotone method that stays above lower quota and Adams' method 
is the unique population monotone method that stays below 
upper quota. 
Note that since Jefferson's method is not the same as Adams' 
this gives another a roof that no population monotone method satis- 
fies quota. Another partial quota concept that is satisfied by 
all divisor methods is the following. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  6 . 5 .  No d i v i s o r  method apportionment simultaneously 
violates upper quota on one state and violates lower quota on 
another. 
While no population monotone method stays within the quota 
a l l  of the time, there are population monotone methods that stay 
within the quota "almost" all of the time; moreover the best 
from this standpoint is Webster's method. The tendency of dif- 
ferent divisor methods to violate quota can be tested using the 
same basic model used to test for bias. The idea is to fix a 
hypothetical apportionment a and a method M, and ask how likely 
- 
it is that some state violates quota given this particular dis- 
tribution of seats. Choose an arbitrary but fixed divisor x and 
let p(a) be the set of all populations p for which a is a re- 
- - - - 
sulting M-apportionment using the divisor x. The simplest and 
most natural case is to assume that the populations pi, and hence 
the quotients pi/x, are independently and uniformly distributed. 
The probability that some state i violates lower quota can, in 
principle, be computed from the expression 
Similarly, the probability that state i violates upper quota 
can be computed from the expression 
The probability that no state violates quota is at most the 
sum of all of these probabilities. However for methods like 
Webster's these probabilities are extremely small, hence diffi- 
cult to estimate theoretically. A more practical approach is 
to estimate the results numerically using a Monte Carlo simulation. 
For a problem in which there are many small states, i.e. 
in which many of the quotients pi/x are close to zero, methods 
like Hill's that automatically give every state 1 seat are very 
likely to violate lower quota on the large states because too 
many s e a t s  w i l l  have been used up on t h e  smal l  ones .  Thus, t h e  
p rope r ty  of  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  g i v i n g  one s e a t  t o  e v e r y  s t a t e  i s  a  
s e r i o u s  d e f e c t  from t h e  p o i n t  of  view o f  s t a y i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  quota .  
I n  1970 t h e r e  w e r e  6 s t a t e s  t h a t  r ece ived  o n l y  1  s e a t  us ing  H i l l ' s  
method; a p r i o r ;  t h e s e  s t a t e s  could be a r b i t r a r i l y  smal l .  However 
i n  f a c t  no s t a t e  had a  quota  less t han  -5. To avo id  t h e  un rea l -  
i s t i c  assumption o f  v e r y  smal l  s t a t e s ,  it was assumed i n  e s t i m a t i n g  
t h e  f u t u r e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  v i o l a t i n g  quota  t h a t  no s t a t e ' s  q u o t i e n t  
would be less t h a n  .5.  Thus t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  v i o l a t i n g  quota  
was e s t ima ted  numer i ca l ly  f o r  each o f  t h e  f i v e  t r a d i t i o n a l  methods 
by choosing a t o  be  t h e  a c t u a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e a t s  i n  1970, and 
- 
choosing t h e  q u o t i e n t s  pi/x independent ly  from a  uniform d i s t r i -  
bu t ion  on t h e  i n t e r v a l  min{ -5 ,d  (ai-1 ) } - < pi/x i d  ( a i )  . 
 he r e s u l t s  
- 
a r e  given i n  Chapter  3 ,  Table 6 .  C l e a r l y  Webs te r ' s  i s  s u p e r i o r  
t o  t h e  o t h e r s  i n  r e g a r d  t o  s t a y i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  quota .  
I n  f a c t  Webster d i d  n o t  advocate  t h a t  a method should always 
s t a y  wi th in  t h e  q u o t a ,  bu t  asked f o r  something s l i g h t l y  weaker. 
Namely, he s a i d ,  it should no t  be p o s s i b l e  t o  t a k e  a  s e a t  from 
one s t a t e  and g i v e  it t o  ano the r  and s imu l t aneous ly  b r i n g  b o t h  
of them n e a r e r  t o  t h e i r  quotas .  
That  i s ,  t h e r e  should be no s t a t e s  i and j such t h a t  
(6.1) q i  - ( a i - l )  < ai  - q i  and a j  + l  - q j  
' q j  - 
Another way of  say ing  t h e  same t h i n g  i s  t h a t  no s t a t e  can 
be brought c l o s e r  t o  i t s  quota  wi thout  moving a n o t h e r  s t a t e  f u r t h e r  
from i t s  quota .  Any method wi th  t h i s  p r o p e r t y  i s  s a i d  t o  be n e a r  
q u o t a .  T h i s  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  i dea  of P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  i n  econom- 
ics. I t  should be  f u r t h e r  noted t h a t  Webster ' s  i d e a  i s  independent 
of whether near quota is interpreted in absolute or relative 
terms. In relative terms it would say that no state can be 
brought closer to its quota o n  a  p e r c e n t a g e  b a s i s  without moving 
another state further from its quota o n  a  p e r c e n t a g e  b a s i s .  In 
other words for no states i and j do we have 
ai-1 a a . + l  a i (6.2) 1 - -  < - -  1 and 3 - 1  > 1 - A  
qi qi 
which is clearly equivalent to (6.1). 
The fallacy of Hill's and Huntington's relative difference 
approach can now be clearly seen: it fails to take into account 
that there is an a 5 s o l u t e  standard against which the allocation 
to any state should be compared --namely the quota. Compared 
to this standard both the relative and the absolute measures of 
difference lead to the same result --Webster's method. 
Theorem 6 . 2  W e b s t e r ' s  m e t h o d  i s  t h e  u n i q u e  p o p u l a t i o n  monotone  
me thod  t h a t  i s  n e a r  q u o t a ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  a b s o l u t e l y  
o r  r e l a t i v e l y .  
P r o o f  o f  Theorem 6. 2 .  If a is not near quota, that is if (6.1) 
or (6.2) holds for some i and j then rearranging we have 
1 < 2(ai-qi) and 1 > 2(qj-a.) 
3 
or 
ai+1/2 < qi 
and a j ' qj 
Hence the min max inequality for Webster's method is violated, 
so a could not be a Webster apportionment. Therefore Webster's 
- 
method is near quota. 
Conversely let M be a population monotone method (i.e. a 
divisor method) different from Webster's. Then there exists a 
2-state problem (p1,p2) in which the M-apportionment is uniquely 
(al+lta2) whereas the W-apportionment is uniquely (al,a2+1). By 
the latter, p2/(a2+1/2) > pl/(a1+1/2). At h = al + a2 + 1 the 
quota of state 1 is 
State 2's quota is 
Therefore the M-apportionment (al+l,a2) is not near quota. 
In the case of minimum requirements the notion of quota must 
be modified because the true quotas of some states may be less 
than their requirements. Hence it may not be possible to satisfy 
the requirements and have enough left over to give the other states 
even their lower quotas. Similar problems arise in the case of 
maximum requirements. The "modified quota" of a state is its pro- 
portional share subject to the requirements of a22 states being 
+ 
met. More precisely, let r ( r be minimum and maximum require- 
* - * 
ments and let q be the "ordinary quotas." Choose a multiplier t 
- 
such that 
S + ( 6 . 3 )  1 mid r i t q i t i  = h 
1 
"Mid" again stands for the middle in value of the three arguments. 
(6.3) uniquely determines t, and the resulting values Ti = 
mid,{ri, tqi, rr} are called the m o d i f i e d  q u o t a s .  The m o d i f i e d  upper  
q u o t a  o f  s t a t e  i i s  ri.1 and t h e  m o d i f i e d  L o w e r  q u o t a  i s  L ~ ~ J .  
1 
The method M s t a y s  v i t h i n  t h c  q u o t a  i f  f o r  a l l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
+ 
r r andM-appor t ionments  a ,  Lq.J 5 a .  < rcii f o r  a l l  i. The 
w 
- 
- - 1 - 1 = 
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  n e a r  q u o t a ,  s t a y i n g  above lower  q u o t a ,  s t a y i n g  
below upper  q u o t a  c a n  be s i m i l a r l y  ex tended  and Theorem 6 . 2  and 
P r o p o s i t i o n s  6 . 1  - 6 . 5  hold  a s  s t a t e d .  
7. STAYING WITHIN THE QUOTA AND HOUSE MONOTONICITY 
The preceding section shows that no population monotone 
method stays within the quota. House monotonicity is a weaker 
property, implied by population monotonicity but not implying it. 
Up to this point the only methods discussed that stay within the 
quota are Hamilton-like and violate both population monotonicity 
and house monotonicity. Is it possible that there are other 
types of methods that stay within the quota and are also house 
monotone? The answer is affirmative. 
The simplest of these methods is the so-called quota method. 
(Balinski and Young (1975)). The Quota method can also be gener- 
alized to obtain a22 house monotone methods that stay within the 
quota. In fact, all apportionments arising from such methods can 
be described by a system of inequalities, much as the divisor 
methods can be described by min max inequalities. This approach 
can be used to adapt traditional methods like those of Adarns, Dean, 
Hill, Webster, Jefferson, and Hamilton so that they always stay 
within the quota. Unfortunately these adaptations suffer acutely 
from the population paradox, so are not to be recommended. 
Satisfying quota can be described in a convenient analytical 
way as follows: ai satisfies lower quota for p and h if and only 
- 
if a.+l > q = p.h/p and satisfies upper quota if and only if 
1 i 1 
a -1 < qi = p.h/p, where p = lpj. Hence a satisfies quota if i 1 - 
and only if 
(7.1) pi/(ai+l) < p/h < pi/(ai-1) for all i. 
The most straightforward way of constructing a house mono- 
tone apportionment solution f is to define it recursively on h 
for every given p. For any apportionment a of h let U(p,a) be 
- - - - 
the set of states that are e l i g i b l e  to receive one more seat 
without exceeding their upper quotas at house size h+1; thus 
U(p,a) = {i : a < p. (h+l)/p). Clearly u(p,a) + Q for every p 
- - i 1 - - - 
and a. The house monotone solutions generated by the following 
- 
recursive procedure defines the Q u o t a  m e t h o d  Q. 
Thecrem 7 . 1 .  E v e r y  s o l u t i o n  f d e f i n e d  a s  foZZows i s  h o u s e  
m o n c t o n e  and  s t a y s  w i t h i n  t h e  q u o t a :  
(ii) if f (p.h) = a then fk(p,h+l) = a +1 for some 
- - - k 
state k E U (a) - satisfying pk/ (ak+l ) , - pi (ai+l ) 
for all iEU(p,a) and f.(p,h+l) = a for all j+k. 
- - I - j 
P r o o f  o f  T h e o r e m  7 . 1 .  It is immediate from the definition that 
every such f is house monotone and that it stays below upper 
quota. 
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f violates lower 
quota for some problem (p,h). As p will be fixed for the re- 
- - 
h ' 
mainder of the proof and f is single-valued, write a = f(p,hl) 
- - 
for every h' - 1 0 .  Also, let p = lei. Since some state, say 
state 1, is below lower quota at h, the set S = {i:a > Pih/P) i 
is nonempty. For each i let h. < h be the least house size for 
1 = 
which = a h i' Choose j E S  such that h = max hi; thus j is j iEs 
the last state in S to have reached the apportionment it has 
at h. Now j did not receive the hth seat, because state 1 was 
also eligible to get the hth seat and had a higher priority, i.e., 
Hence h  < h.  L e t  T  be  t h e  set  o f  s t a t e s  t h a t  r e c e i v e  j 
s e a t s  between h . + l  and h  i n c l u s i v e .  By d e f i n i t i o n  of  TI  T n S  = @ ,  
3 
t h a t  i s  
( 7 . 5 )  a ?  < pih/p f o r  a l l  i E T  . 1 = 
T h e r e f o r e  u s i n g  ( 7 . 3 )  
h  . h  
p i / ( a i3  + 1 )  1 - p i / a .  2 p/h p . / a h  = p . / a h j  f o r  a l l  ~ E T .  1 - I j I I 
From t h i s  and t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  no member o f  
T  was e l i g i b l e  t o  g e t  t h e  h  t h  s e a t :  j 
hj-1 - 
ai 
- h j  > p . h . / p  a i  = f o r  a l l  i E T  . 1 3  
s u b t r a c t i n g  ( 7 . 6 )  from ( 7 . 5 )  and summing o v e r  T I  
S  
D i v i d i n g  by h - h  > 0,  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  lp .  lp = p ,  a  j T ~ -  1 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  s i n c e  j and p  > 0.  j 
+ P r o p o s i t i o n  7 . 1 .  Given r e q u i r e m e n t s  r 5 r d e f i n e  U ( p , a )  = 
- - - - - 
{ i : a  < q ( h + l ) )  whenever a  i s  a n  appor t ionment  f o r  h. Every i - 
s o l u t i o n  f  d e f i n e d  r e c u r s i v e l y  a s  f o l l o w s  i s  house monotone 
and s t a y s  w i t h i n  t h e  q u o t a :  
+ 
ii) if f (p, h) = a and h < lri , then fk (p, h+l ) = ak + 1 
- - .., 
for some state k ~ U ( p , a )  satisfying pk/(a +1) 1 
- - k - 
pi/(ai+l) for all iEU(p,a) - - and f. (p,h+l) = a I - j 
for all j 4 k. 
The argument parallels that of Theorem 7.1 and leads to the 
analog of (7.6) ah 5 Gi (h) = thpi/p for all i E T. Next deduce 1 - 
that no member of T was eligible to get the h j th seat. Since 
every member of T gets at least one seat between hi and h, this 
+ h.-1 
means that ri > ai3 = ah' > q(h.1 = t.h p./p for all iET. 
1 = I 3 1 1  
From these two expressions we obtain 
and a contradiction, since j V T .  
Any house monotone method may be described recursively on 
the house size h by defining which states are eligible to get 
the "next" seat given the current apportionment. The family a 
- 
of all apportionment solutions f that are house monotone and stay 
- 
within the quota may be described in this way using a suitable 
notion of eligibility. 
Fix p > 0, and a an apportionment of h. For each integer 
.., - - 
a 2 - 1 let Sa = Su(p,a) be the set of states i such that 
- 
Lpi(h+a)/pJ > ai, and let a = ap,a) be the least a 2 1 such that 
- - 
- 
&pi (h+a)/pJ - ai) 1 - a. Define L(p,a) = S or if no such 5 
- - - 
Sa a 
exists, let L(p,a) be the set of all states. 
- - 
To construct a house-monotone seauence of apportionments 
continuing from a that stay within the quota, it is clearly 
- 
n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  t h e  ( h + l l s t  s e a t  be  g i v e n  t o  some s t a t e  i n  L ( p , a )  
- - 
s i n c e  o t h e r w i s e  a t  house s i z e  h + a some s t a t e  i n  L ( p , a )  would 
- - 
have f a l l e n  below i t s  lower q u o t a .  I t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r l y  n e c e s s a r y  
t h a t  t h e  ( h + l I s t  s e a t  be  g i v e n  t o  some s t a t e  i n  U ( p , a ) .  o r  else 
- - 
t h e  upper  q u o t a  would be  v i o l a t e d  a t  h + l .  I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  
t h e s e  two c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  b o t h  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  t o  de- 
t e r m i n e  which s t a t e s  a r e  e l i g i b l e  t o  g e t  t h e  ( h + l )  st s e a t .  
Theorem 7 . 2 .  f  i s  a  house  monotone  s o l u t i o n  s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a  
i f  and o n l y  i f  f o r  e a c h  p > 0 f  i s  c o n s t r u c t . r ?  
- - 
r e c u r s i v e l y  a s  f o l l o w s :  
(i) f ( p , O )  - = 0 
(ii) i f  f  ( p , h )  = a t h e n  f  ( p , h + l  ) i s  found by g i v i n g  
- - - 
a i + l  s e a t s  t o  some one s t a t e  i € L ( p , a )  n U ( p , a )  
- - 
and a s e a t s  t o  e a c h  j f i. j 
in t h i s  r e c u r s i o n  t h e  e l i g i b i l i t y  c l a s s  
L ( p , a )  f i ~ ( p , a )  i s  n e v e r  e m p t y .  
- - - - 
P r o o f  o f  Theoren: 7 . 2 .  I t  has  a l r e a d y  been n o t e d  t h a t  e v e r y  F E Q  
must be  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  (i) and (ii).  Converse ly ,  i f  f  i s  d e f i n e d  
a s  i n  (i) and (ii) t h e n  it i s  o b v i o u s l y  house monotone and s t a y s  
below upper  q u o t a .  Suppose t h a t  f o r  some p and h ,  a  = f  ( p ,  h )  
- - - 
1 
v i o l a t e s  lower  q u o t a .  L e t  0,  a  , .. . , a h  b e  t h e  a p p o r t i o n m e n t s  by 
- - - 
h h- 1 f  up t o  h ,  and suppose  t h a t  Lpkh/pJ > a k .  Then k E S1 = Sl ( p , a  ) 
- - 
h-1 ) h h- 1 
and 1 (Lpih/pJ - a i  - > 1 (Lpih/pJ - a i )  - 1 ,  s o  a ( p . a  - - ) = 1 
S1 1 
and S1 = ~ ( ~ , a ~ - ' ) .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  hth s e a t  was g i v e n  t o  some 
- - 
h - l )  > s t a t e  i n  S1 , b u t  n o t  t o  k. s o  i n  f a c t  1 (Lpih/pJ - a i  
1 
h h- 1 1 (pih/p - a i )  and 1 (Lpih/pJ - a i  2 2 -  
- - 
h-2 
> ah-' implies pih/p > ai so S2 = For each it pih/p 
h- 2 S2(~,a )2S1(p,ah-l). -. -., Therefore 1 (Lpih/pJ-ai) - 2
s, 
h-2 1 (Lpih/pJ - a.) > 2 whence a(p,a ) 5 2. Since pi (h-2+a)/p > 
1 = - . - 
1 
h-2 
ah-2 im~lies p. h/p > it follows that L(p.a ) gS2. There- 
1 1 - - 
fore the (h-l)st seat was given to some state in S2 but not in 
S1 , whence 1 (Lpih/pJ - a h-2) > 1 ( ~ p ~ h / p ~  - ai h-2) - > 2 and 
S2 1 
- 
h-2) > 3. Continuing in this manner it follows 1 (Lpih/pJ - ai 
- 
that for Sh = Sh(pI0) 1 (L~ih/~J - 0) - > h+l, which is impossible. - 
Sh 
It remains to show that the eligibility class L(p,a) nU(p,a) 
- - w - 
must be nonempty at each step of the recursion. If L = L(p,a) 
- - 
is the set of all states the result holds. Otherwise there is 
- - - 
an n = a(p,a) - > 1 such that l(Lpi(h+&)/~J -ai) 2 a, where 
- -  - 
7 
L 
Lpi(h+a)/pJ > ai for each iEL. If a =  1 this says that pi(h+l)/ 
p ,  a +I, so ~ E L ~ u .  If a > 1 but L n u  = @ ,  then pi(h+l)/p<ai i 
for all i E L  and so 
- 
By definition of L, 1 (pi (h+a) /p - ai) 2 a, hence we obtain 
L 
- 
a 5 - (2;-1) and lpi/P 2 - z/(a-1) > 1 (since a > 11, a contra- 
L L 
diction. 
To compute the set L(p,a) it is not necessary to consider 
- - 
- - 
every i, pi(h+a)/p > ai and 
infinitely many a. In fact, if a . max 1 aip:7;h'p 
i 
, then for 
S S 1 (Lp. (h+a) /pJ -ai) < 1 (pi (h+a) /p - ail = h + a - lai = a 
1 1 1 
Let aEQ(p,h) if and only if there is a house monotone 
... ... 
solution f satisfying quota with a = f(p,h). The Quota method Q 
... ... 
-. 
a -pih/p 
showing that 6 ( ~ , a )  2 max 
- - P~/P 
is a sub-method of h and is determined by a more stringent crite- 
rion of eligibility. But this eligibility criterion is also very 
simple to compute, as it only "looks ahead" by one seat. Given 
if it is defined at all. 
a ~Q(p,h), it is only necessary to find those states for which 
% -. 
pi (h+l ) /p > ai; the eligible class at a is then 
... 
{i:p./a 1 i >~/(h+l) and pi/(ai+l) >p./(a.+l) whenever p./a >p/(h+l)}. 
- 3  I I j 
As in the case of rank-index methods, it is also possible 
to give a " local" characterization of all &apportionments for 
a given p and h by a system of inequalities. 
... 
Thsorem 7 . 3 .  a Ea(p,h) if and only if a 2 0, lai = h and 
... - _ - ... 
1 min (ai,rpi(h-B)/pl) 2 h-0, for all a,B 2 - 0. 
i 
The c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f e a s i b l e  f o r  e v e r y  p and h. 
... 
As in the computation of L(p,a) it is easy to verify that 
... ... 
if the inequalities hold for 
then they hold for a l l  a B ? 0. 
- 
0 < a 5 max 
- 
- i 
- 
ai - pih/p 1 and 0 < 0 < max P~/P = - j 
The conditions are transparently necessary if a - = f(p,h) -. 
for some house monotone f that stays within the quota. Suffi- 
ciency is established by showing that if a satisfies the condi- 
." 
tions at h > 0, then there is an a', differing from a by exactly 
-. - 
one seat, say at state k, such that a' satisfies the conditions 
- 
at h-1 and k€L(p,aV) flU(p,al). The result then follows from an 
- - - -. 
induction argument using Theorem 7.2. 
The characterization in Theorem (7.2) suggests an approach, 
first proposed by Still (1979) in which various classical methods, 
like the divisor methods or Hamilton's method, can be modified 
so as to be both house monotone and stay within the quota. Let 
d(a) be a divisor criterion and in the recursion of Theorem 7.2 
(ii) give the (h+l) st seat to some eligible state that maximizes 
p./d(ai) over all eligible states. In this way we obtain the 
1 
Quota-Jefferson method (the same as the Quota method), the Quota- 
Webster method, the Quota-Hill method, etc. Likewise we could 
define the Quota-Hamilton method by giving the (h+lIst seat to 
some eligible state with maximum "remainder" pi(h+l)/p - ai. 
To illustrate how such methods work, we apply the Quota 
method to the four-state example shown in Table 7.1. 
State Population Quota 9-Appt. Quota - A p t .  Quota 9-Appt. 
* * 
A 501 4.59 5 5.01 6 5.43 6 
Total 12 00 11-00 11 12.00 12 13.00 13 
Table 7.1. Example Illustrating the Quota Method 
(Starred State Gets the Next Seat). 
The r u l e  f o r  computing t h e  Q u o t a  method i s  s i m p l e r  t h a n  t h e  
o t h e r s  b e c a u s e  (by  Theorem 7.1)  it i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c a l c u l a t e  
t h e  sets L ( p , a )  a t  e a c h  s t a g e  o f  t h e  r e c u r s i o n .  It  s u f f i c e s  t o  
... ... 
maximize p i / ( a i + l )  o v e r  a l l  i € U ( p , a ) ,  i . e .  t h e  e l i g i b l e  s t a t e s  
.., - 
a r e  t h o s e  t h a t  c o u l d  g e t  one  more s e a t  w i t h o u t  v i o l a t i n g  upper  
q u o t a  a t  t h e  n e x t  l a r g e r  house  s i z e .  The r e c u r s i o n  b e g i n s  a t  
h  = 0 and l e a d s  t o  t h e  s o l u t i o n  a t  h  = 11 shown i n  T a b l e  7.1.  
The q u o t a s  a t  h  = 12 i d e n t i f y  t h e  e l i g i b l e  s t a t e s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  
t o  b e  A I  C ,  and D. Of t h e s e  p A / ( a  +1)  i s  maximum hence  it g e t s  A 
one more s e a t  a t  house  s i z e  12.  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  B I  C ,  and D a r e  
e l i g i b l e  and s t a t e  B d e s e r v e s  t h e  n e x t  s e a t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
J e f f e r s o n  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n .  
C o n s i d e r  now a  v a r i a t i o n  o f  t h e  above example i n  which 
s t a t e  B g a i n s  i n  p o p u l a t i o n  and a l l  o t h e r  s t a t e s  s t a y  t h e  same. 
T a b l e  7.2 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  Q u o t a  method c a l c u l a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  c a s e ,  
b e g i n n i n g  w i t h  h  = 11.  
S t a t e  Population Quota A p t .  Quota Q-Appt. Quota Q-Appt. 
D 149 1.36 1 1.48 1 1.61 1 
- - -
Total  1206 li. 00 11 12.00 12 13.00 13 
T a b l e  7 . 2 .  Example showing Q u o t a  method n o t  P o p u l a t i o n  
Monotone 
The s o l u t i o n s  a t  h  = 1  a r e  t h e  same, b u t  now t h e  o n l y  
e l i g i b l e  s t a t e s  a r e  C and D ,  so C g e t s  t h e  n e x t  s e a t .  A t  h  = 12 
s t a t e s  A ,  B and D a r e  e l i g i b l e  and A g e t s  t h e  n e x t  s e a t  a c c o r d i n g  
to the Jefferson divisor criterion. Therefore while state B 
gained in population relative to all other states, it actually 
lost a seat at h = 13. Similar examples show that the Quota- 
Webster method, the Quota-Hill method, and indeed all methods 
of this type violate population monotonicity and hence are not 
to be recommended. 
Proposition 7.2. The analog of Theorem 7.2 holds in the 
presence of minimum and maximum requirements by defining 
U(p,a) - - = {i:ai <gi(h+l)j and L(p,a) - - = {i:qi(h+a) >a,) 1 
for some least a such that I(qi(h+a) -ai) 2 - a or, if no 
T 
L 
such a exists, L(p,a) is the set of all states. 
w - 
+ 
Proposition 7.3. Given requirements r 5 r and a 2 0, lai=h, 
- 
- 
- -., - w i 
there is a house monotone solution f that stays within the 
quota with a - = f(p,h) - if and only if 
and 
1 min a i i h -  h - B for all a. B 2 0 . 
i 
8 .  UNIFORMITY 
The problem of  f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  is  b u t  one i n s t a n c e  o f  a  
problem of f a i r  d i v i s i o n :  How should  an  i n h e r i t a n c e  be sha red  
among h e i r s ?  How should  a  p u b l i c  good ( e . g . ,  a i r p o r t  c a p a c i t y )  
be sha red  among u s e r s  ( e . g . ,  a i r  c a r r i e r s ) ?  How should  t a x e s  be  
sha red  among r e s i d e n t s ?  How should  s e a t s  i n  Congress  be sha red  
among s t a t e s ?  An i n h e r e n t  p r i n c i p l e  o f  any f a i r  d i v i s i o n  i s  t h a t  
e v e r y  p a r t  o f  a f a i r  d i v i s i o n  s h o u l d  b e  f a i r .  For example, one 
p r o p e r t y  of  a  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  o f  an  i n h e r i t a n c e  shou ld  be t h a t  no 
s u b s e t  o f  h e i r s  would want t o  make t r a d e s  a f t e r  t h e  d i v i s i o n  i s  
made. The p r i n c i p l e  i s  ve ry  g e n e r a l .  
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of  f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  s a y s  
t h a t  an  appor t ionment  t h a t  i s  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  a l l  s t a t e s  must be 
a c c e p t a b l e  i f  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  any s u b s e t  o f  s t a t e s  cons ide red  a l o n e .  
The way i n  which two s t a t e s  s h a r e  a  g i v e n  number of s e a t s  i s  i n -  
dependent  of  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  s t a t e s .  T h i s  i s  somewhat 
r e m i n i s c e n t  o f  Arrow's "independence o f  i r r e l e v a n t  a l t e r n a t i v e s "  
axiom i n  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  s o c i a l  c h o i c e ,  b u t  w i t h  an impor t an t  
d i f f e r e n c e :  it can be r e a l i z e d .  I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  f a i r  d i v i s i o n  
and even more p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  appor t ionment ,  it i s  a  c e n t r a l  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n ,  s i n c e  i n e v i t a b l y  each s t a t e  w i l l  compare i t s  r ep re -  
s e n t a t i o n  w i th  each of  i t s  sister s t a t e s .  
( B a l i n s k i  and Young, 1978b) 
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a  method M i s  u n i f o r m A i f  f o r  every  t. 2 < t 5 s ,  
( a l  I .. . , a s )  E M (  ( p l  , .. . ,pS)  , h )  i m p l i e s  ( a l  , .. . , a t )  EM((pl.. . . , p t )  ,l:ai) , 
t and i f  a l s o  ( b l ,  ... , b t )  EM( ( p l f .  . . , P t ) 1 , a i )  t h e n  ( b l  ~ - = - t b ~ r  
a t+ l  , . . . , as )  E M (  ( p l  , . . . ,ps)  , h )  . I n  o t h e r  words, each  r e s t r i c t i o n  
o f  a  f a i r  appor t ionment  i s  f a i r ;  moreover,  i f  a  r e s t r i c t i o n  ad- 
m i t s  a  d i f f e r e n t  appor t ionment  of t h e  same number of s e a t s  -- 
that is, if the restricted problem admits a tie --then there is a 
corresponding tie in the entire apportionment. The min-max de- 
scription of divisor methods immediately establishes that all 
divisor methods are uniform. 
Uniform methods include more than the divisor methods, how- 
ever. In fact,the class of uniform methods can be described by 
generalizing the recursive procedure for computing divisor 
methods. 
Let a r c q : . - i n d e x  r(p,a) be any real-valued function of 
rational p > 0 and integer a 2 - 0 that is monotone decreasing in 
a: p a - 1  > r p , a  Now define a particular house monotone 
solution f as follows: 
(i) for h = 0 let f ( p , ~ )  = 0 . 
- - 
(ii) if f (p,h) = a, then f (p,h+l) is found by giving 
- - - 
> ai+l seats to some state i such that r(pi,ai) = 
r(pj,aj) and a seats to each j i. j 
Let F b e  the set of all particular solutions defined recurs- 
ively by (i) and (ii) . The r a n k - i n d e x  m e t h o d  b a s e d  o n  r (p,a) is 
defined by 
M(p,h) - = ia:a=f(p,h) for some f~2) . 
- - - -  
Divisor methods are just special cases of rank-index methods 
in which the rank-index has the form r (p,a) = p/d (a) . The fol- 
lowing theorem shows that the min-max inequality holds also for 
rank-index methods, hence in particular all rank-index methods 
are uniform. 
Theorem 8 . 1  M(p,h)  - = ! i n t e g e r  a 2 O :  _ - _  min r ( p i , a i - 1 )  l m a x  r ( p i , a i ) )  
a . > O  a . > O  
1 1- 
i s  t h e  r a n k - i n d e x  method based  on  r ( p , a ) .  
Proof  o f  Theorem 8 . 1 .  F i r s t  w e  show t h a t  i f  a  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  in -  
-.. 
e q u a l i t i e s  f o r  some g i v e n  p  and h ,  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t s  f  E F w i t h  
- 
f  ( p , h )  = a.  I f  f a l s e ,  l e t  5 be t h e  l e a s t  h  2 0  f o r  which it i s  
- - - 
f a l s e  f o r  t h e  g i v e n  p.  L e t  s t a t e  i s a t i s f y  r ( p i , a i - 1 )  2 r ( p  , a  -1) 
- j j 
f o r  a l l  j p i and d e f i n e  a '  as f o l l o w s :  a '  = a -1 and a '  = a 
- i i j j  
f o r  a l l  j i. Then 
P -  r , a  r p , a  f o r  a l l  j i 
and 
Hence a '  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  f o r  p  and h-1 and by t h e  
- - 
i n d u c t i o n  h y p o t h e s i s  t h e r e  i s  some s o l u t i o n  f  €*wi th  f ( p , h - 1 )  = a ' .  
- - 
L e t  f  h-l be t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  of f up t o  house  s i z e  h-1. S i n c e  r ( p i , a i )  2 -
r p j a )  f o r  a l l  j ,  t h e  r e c u r s i v e  p r o c e d u r e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e r e  j 
i s  some e x t e n s i o n  g  o f  f  h-' which i s  i n  9 and such  t h a t  g  ( p  , h )  = a .  
- - 
Converse ly ,  suppose  t h a t  f o r  some f  €9, a = f ( p , h )  d o e s  n o t  
- - 
s a t i s f y  t h e  min max i n e q u a l i t y ;  s a y  r ( p i , a i )  > r ( p  , a  -1)  f o r  j j 
some i p j .  L e t  k  - 5 h  be  t h e  house s i z e  a t  which (by  t h e  r e c u r -  
s i v e  p r o c e d u r e  c o n s t r u c t i n g  f )  s t a t e  j r e c e i v e d  i t s  a j th  s e a t .  
A t  k-1 s t a t e  i had a; 2 a s e a t s  and s t a t e  j had a '  = a -1 s e a t s .  i j j 
But t h e n  r ( p i , a j )  2 - r ( p i , a i )  > r ( p  , a ! )  s o  r ( p  , a ' )  was n o t  j I j j 
maximum, c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  r e c u r s i v e  p rocedure .  
The same rank- index  method c a n  be r e p r e s e n t e d  by many d i f -  
f e r e n t  r a n k - i n d i c e s .  I n  f a c t  any two r a n k - i n d i c e s  r and r '  t h a t  
a r e  o r d e r  e q u i v a l e n t ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  r ( p , a )  2 - r ( q , b )  i f f  
r' (p,a) r' (q,b) , yield the same rank-index method, by Theorem 8.1. 
- 
The converse is true as well. 
Theorem 8.2 Two rank-indices r' and r" represant the same 
rank-index method M if and only if r' is order 
equivalent with r". 
Proof of Theorem 8.2. Let M be a rank-index method based on r' 
and also based on r". We will show that r' is order equivalent 
to r". Suppose, by way of contradiction, that r'(p,a) > rt(a,b) 
while r" (p,a) 5 - r" (q,b) for some pairs (p,a) and (q,b). 
- - 
Let (a,b) be an M-apportionment of h = a+b+l seats for the 
two-state problem (p,q). If a 5 - a then 5; 2 - b+l and by the mono- 
tonicity of r', 
but this contradicts the min max inequality of Theorem 8.1. 
Hence 
- - - 
a - > a+l and b 5 b for all M-apportionments (a,b). 
- - 
But then 
again contradicting the min max inequality unless these inequal- 
ities are all equalities and a = a+l, b = b. Therefore by 
Theorem 8.1 (a,b+l) is also an M-apportionment, contradicting 
(8.1). 0 
Rank-index methods are not only uniform: they are essenti- 
ally the on29 methods that are uniform. This is true with con- 
ditions that are much weaker than those that have been assumed 
heretofore. A method M is said to be balanced  if whenever two 
states have equal populations then their apportionments do not 
differ by more than one seat. This is a much less demanding 
concept than weak proportionality and is satisfied by every non- 
frivolous method known to the authors. (See Proposition 8.1). 
The only other elementary principle that is necessary is that of 
symmetry. U n t i l  f u r t h e r  n o t i c e  we assume only that all methods 
are balanced and symmetric. 
Theorem 8 .3  A method i s  u n i f o r m  i f  and o n l y  i f  it i s  a  
r a n k - i n d e x  method.  
CoroZZary. Every u n i f o r m  method i s  house-monotone.  
This surprising corollary is an immediate consequence of 
the theorem and the definition of a rank-index method. It high- 
lights both the importance and the strength of the uniformity 
concept. 
Proof o f  Theorem 8 . 3 .  We have already noted that a rank-index 
method is uniform; and, of course, it is balanced and symmetric. 
. TO prove the converse we show that a suitably defined prior- 
ity relation on pairs (p,a) is an order, and that it can be re- 
presented by a real-valued, order-preserving function r(p,a). 
Suppose that M is uniform, balanced and symmetric. The 
following must then hold. 
If (p,q; h) has M-apportionment (a,b) , and (p,q; h' ) 
( 8 . 2 )  has M-apportionment (al,b'), and a' < a, b' > b, 
then h = h', a' = a-1 and b' = b+l. 
Without loss of generality assume that a'+b' - > a+b, say a'+b' - 
a+b+k. To prove (8.2) consider first the two cases k = 0 and 
k = 1. 
k = 0. Let (x,x' ,y,y') be an M-apportionment for (p,p,q,q;2h). 
Since M is balanced, Ix-x' 1 5 - 1 and ly-~'l 5 - 1. Either x+x' and 
y+y' are both even or both are odd. Hence, either x = x' and 
y = y' or (using symmetry) x' = x+l and y' = y-1 . In either case 
xt+y' = x+y = h = h'. Uniformity implies that (a,b) may be sub- 
stituted for (x,y) and (at ,b') for (x' ,yl) to obtain the M-appor- 
tionment (a,at,b,b'). By balanced, la-a'( 5 - 1 and lb-b'l 5 - 1, 
SO, since a' < a and b' > b, we have a' = a-1 and b' = b+l. 
k = 1. a1+b' = a+b+l, b' >b, a' < a  implies b' 2 - b+2. Use 
balanced to deduce that (p,p,q,q;2h+l) has an M-apportionment 
either of form (x,x+l,y,y) or (x,x,y,y+l) where x+y = h. By 
uniformity it follows that (a,a1,b,b') is an M-apportionment. 
But b' > b+2 contradicts balanced. 
Therefore, if (a, b) apportions (p,q; h) and (at, b' ) apportions 
(p,q;h+l) then we must have a' - l a  and b'zb. - That is, every par- 
ticuZar M-soZution f is house-monotone o n  two states. It is 
therefore impossible to have a' <a, b' > b  and a'+bt > a+b. This 
completes the proof of (8.2) . 
Consider now the family -9 = { (p,a) : p > 0, a - 1 0 ,  p rational, 
a integer). Define a relation > on $as follows: 
(p,a-1) 2 (q,b) if and only if there is some 
- - (8.3) M-apportionment (a,b) for (p,q) and h = a + 6 
- 
such that a 2 a > 0,  b 5 b. 
-. - 
Intuitively, the method M gives preference for an extra seat to 
a state having population p and a-1 seats over that of a state 
having population q and b seats. 
Write (p,a) > (q,b) if (p,a) I (q,b) and not (q,b) 2 (p,a). 
Also write (p,a) - (q,b) if both (p,a) 2 (q,b) and (q,b) 2 (p,a). 
Then from (8.2) we have 
(p,a-1) > (q,b) if and only if either a' - > a  or b' z b  - 
(8.4) for every M-apportionment (al,b') for (pIq) and all h, 
and 
(p,a-1) - (q,b) if and only if (a-1 ,b+l) and (a,b) 
(8.5) 
are both apportionments of (p,q;a+b). 
Next we show that the relation 2 is a partial order on 9, that is, 
(8.6) (pta) 2 (q,b) and (q,b) - > (r,c) implies (p,a) 2 (r,c). 
Note, first, that (p,a) and (r,c) are comparable since one can 
consider the problem (p,r;a+c+l). To prove (8.6) we suppose that 
( r , ~ )  > (p,a) and derive a contradiction. 
Construct the problem (p,q,r;a+b+c+l). By (8.4) and uni- 
formity every apportionment (x,y,z) of this problem satisfies 
either z L - c+l or x 5 - a. 
Suppose z 2 - c+l . (q,b) z (r,c) implies that either y - lb+l 
(or z 2 c) for every (y,z), or that (b+l,c) and (b,c+l) are both 
apportionments for q r  If y - > b+l then x 5 - a-1 and so (q,b) 2 
(p,a-1), a contradiction. Otherwise, (b+l,c) must be an appor- 
tionment, again a contradiction. 
Suppose, then, that x ( - a and z - c, which means y 2 - b+l. 
Then (q,b) 2 (p,a), and so (q,b) - (p,a) and (a+l,b) and (aIb+l) 
must both be apportionments, a contradiction. This establishes 
(8.6). 
The fact that 2 is a partial order on the countable set 9 
implies that there exists an order preserving function r from9 
to the real numbers. The function r may be constructed as 
0 1 2  follows. Let n ,n ,n , ... be an enumeration of all pairs in&', 
0 k 
and for each k define an order-preserving function Ok: {n , . . . ,n 1 +R 
such that Ok agrees with I$ k- 1 0 on , . . , n k .  Define r to be 
the union of all the Okvs. 
1-, 
Let a be any M-apportionment for the problem (p;h). By 
- - 
definition of ? and uniformity, p,ai-1 1 2 (pj ,a*) for all i f j, 3 
a > 0. Moreover, by balanced (pi,pi:2a.) has the u n i q u e  appor- i 1 
tionment (ai,ai), whence p i , a i -  > p a  . Therefore a satis- 
- 
fies the min max inequality 
(8.7) min r(pi,ai-1) z m a x  - r(p , a )  
a.>O a j j 
1 j 
and, moreover, 
(8. 8) r(p,a-1) > r(p,a) for all p, a > 0. 
Suppose, conversely, that a satisfies (8.7), lai = h. We must 
- 
then show that a is an M-apportionment for (p;h). Let b be some 
- - - 
M-apportionment for (p;h) and suppose b $ a. Choose i and j so 
- - - 
that ai < bi and a > b j I *  - - Both a and b satisfy (8.7) and r(p,a) 
is monotone decreasing in a, implying 
- 
and so all inequalities are equalities. Moreover, by (8.8), 
bj = a -1 and bi = ai+l. j ~ u t  r(pi,bi-1) = r(pj,b.) says that 3 
(pi,bi-1 1 - (p.,bj), so by (8.5) ( b - , b + 1  = (ai,a.) is an al- 3 3 3 
ternative apportionment of a + a seats between pi and p i j j BY 
uniformity (ai,a ) may be substituted for (b ,b.) in b to produce j i I - 
an M-apportionment b' that differs from a in fewer components. 
- - 
Continuing in this manner we conclude that a itself must be an 
- 
* 
M-apportionment. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.3. 
Although uniformity as a property seems innocuous, since so 
natural, it has surprisingly strong implications. It can be satis- 
fied only by rank-index methods under very general conditions. 
R e i n s t a t z  now the elementary principles that any method should 
be homogeneous, symmetric and weakly proportional (but not neces- 
sarily complete). 
Theorem 8 . 4  A method M i s  u n i f o r m  and weakly  p o p u l a t i o n  
monotone i f  and o n l y  i f  it  i s  a d i v i s o r  method.  
Proo f  o f  Theorem 8 . 4 .  A uniform method that is weakly proportion- 
al is balanced (Proposition 8.1). Therefore, M is a rank-index 
method with some r(p,a) that is monotone decreasing in a. Further- 
more, f l  homogeneous means that (xp,a) ? (xq, b) for rational x > 0 
if and only if (p,a) 1 (q,b) and so r(xp,a) r(xq,b) if and only 
if r(p,a) 2 r(q,b). 
Suppose M is weakly population monotone. Then, for any 
populations p' > p > 0 and any integer a 2 - 0 the two-state problem 
(p1,p;2a+l) has only apportionments of form (al,a), where a' >a+l. - 
Therefore, r (p' ,a) > r (p,a) , that is, r (p,a) is monotone in- 
creasing in p. 
Fix a 1 2 .  - Thenr(1,a) < r 1 1  < r(a+l,a). ~ e t @ =  
{p :r(p,a) - >r(l,l)) and define pa = inf.Y3. By the preceding in- 
equalities 1 5 - pa 5 - a+l , so pa is finite. It may be irrational; 
however, in any case, for any increasing sequence of rationals 
* 
A variant of this result characterizing rank-index methods 
by a slightly weaker formulation of uniformity together with house 
monotonicity is proved in (Balinski and Young 1 9 7 7 0 ) .  
P  a ( n )  + p a  and any r a t i o n a l  E 0  t h e r e  i s  an n  ( E )  s o  tha t .  f o r  
n  2 - n ( ~ )  
T h e r e f o r e ,  s i n c e  M i s  homogeneous, 
(8. 9 )  r ( p , a )  2 ~ ( P / P  a ( n ) , l )  and r ( p / ( p  a ( n ) + ~ ) , l )  < r ( p , a )  
f o r  any r a t i o n a l  E > 0  and n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e .  
a  Define d ( a )  = p  f o r  a  2 - 2 and d ( 1 )  = 1.  I f  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
0  
a  f i n i t e  = i n f  .ioo > 0 ,  l e t  d ( 0 )  = p  ; o t h e r w i s e ,  d ( 0 )  = 0. W e  
c l a i m  t h a t  by t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  p / d ( a )  i s  o r d e r  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  r ( p , a ) .  
C o n s i d e r ,  f i r s t ,  t h e  c a s e  d ( O )  > 0.  Suppose r ( p , a )  2 r ( q , b ) .  
Then by ( 8 . 9 ) ,  w i t h  r a t i o n a l  i n c r e a s i n g  p  a ( n ) +  pa ,  9 b ( n ) +  qb and 
any r a t i o n a l  E > 0 ,  
f o r  n  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e ,  and s o ,  by weak p o p u l a t i o n  m o n o t o n i c i t y  
P / ( P a ( n ) + E )  < q/q b  ( n )  
imply ing  
p/pa _i q/q o r  p / d ( a )  ~ q / d ( b )  
If r ( p , a )  = r ( q l b )  t h e n  r ( p , a )  5 r ( q , b )  and r ( q , b )  5 r ( p , a )  and 
s o  p / d ( a )  = q / d ( b ) .  
C o n s i d e r ,  t h e n ,  t h e  c a s e  d ( 0 )  = 0. The same r e a s o n i n g  a s  
above a p p l i e s  f o r  a l l  a , b  > 0. d ( 0 )  = 0  means t h a t  r ( p , O )  > r ( l , l )  
f o r  a l l  p ,  t h u s  r ( p , O )  > r ( q , b )  f o r  a l l  b  > 0  and a l l  p , q .  Simi- 
l a r l y ,  p/d(O) > q / d ( b )  s i n c e  d ( b )  0. For  a  = b  = 0 ,  r ( p , O )  - > 
r (q ,O)  i f  and o n l y  i f  p  2 q  which h o l d s  i f  and o n l y  i f  p/O 2 - q/O 
by c o n v e n t i o n .  
This theorem has strong implications. Notice, first, that 
without invoking the completeness property one obtains divisor 
methods, which can trivially be made complete since they are 
continuous. Most important, the properties that (i) any part of 
a fair division must be fair (uniformity) and (ii) a greater claim 
of one player over another guarantees the first at.least as great 
a part of the spoils as the second (weak population monotonicity) 
are sufficient to characterize divisor methods. This provides 
yet another way of seeing why divisor methods are really the only 
ones that are suitable candidates for apportionment. 
Proposition 8.1. If M is uniform and weakly proportional, then 
M is balanced. 
(One shows that for every a 1 0  - the problem (p,p,p1p;4a+2) 
has a unique apportionment of form (x,x,y,y) up to permutations. 
Using this and induction on a it may be shown that in each of 
the problems (p,p;2a+l), (p,p1p;3a), (p,pIp;3a+l) , and (p,p,p; 
3a+2) each state must receive either a or a+l seats. Conclude 
finally that M is balanced.) 
In the next three propositions a method M is assumed to be 
only uniform and symmetric (see Balinski and Young 1978a). 
Proposition 8.2. M is the method of Jefferson if and only if it 
satisfies lower quota. 
P r o p o s i ~ t o n  8.3. M is the method of Adams if and only if it 
satisfies upper quota. 
Proposition 8.4. M is the method of Webster if and only if it 
is near to quota. 
Proposition 8.5. T h e r e  e x i s t s  no u n i f o r m  and symmetric method 
t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a .  
Proposition 8.6. The c o n c e p t s  o f  r a n k - i n d e x  methods  and o f  u n i -  
f o r m i t y  may b e  g e n e r a l i z e d  t o  i n c l u d e  minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  and 
t h e  v a r i o u s  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  h o l d  f o r  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e .  
A r e l a t e d  p rob lem i s  t h a t  o f  proportional representation; 
h e r e  p  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  v o t e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  and a  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
- * 
* 
of  s e a t s .  C o n s i d e r  a prob lem(p ,h ) ,  where  o n e  p a r t y  r e c e i v e s  p  
- 
* 
v o t e s  and  a  s e a t s ,  and a n o t h e r  g e t s  p v o t e s  and  a s e a t s .  
Suppose t h a t  b e f o r e  t h e  s e a t s  a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  t h e s e  two p a r t i e s  
* 
c o a l e s c e  i n t o  o n e  p a r t y  w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l  p  + p, t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  
o f  a l l  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  s t a y i n g  t h e  same. I t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  a s k  
how t h e  t o t a l  number o f  s e a t s  t h e  c o a l e s c e d  p a r t y  now g e t s  corn- 
* 
p a r e s  w i t h  a  + a. A symmetric method M i s  s a i d  t o  be  stable i f  
a f t e r  c o a l e s c i n g  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  i n  which t h e  
* - * 
c o a l e s c e d  p a r t y  g e t s  b  s e a t s  and a  + a  - 1  ( b  a  + a + 1 .  
- - 
T h i s  i d e a  was a p p a r e n t l y  f i r s t  p r o p o s e d  by E r l a n g  ( 1 9 0 7 ) .  
Proposition 8 .  7. A d i v i s o r  method w i t h  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d  ( a )  
i s  s t a b l e  i f  and  o n l y  i f  d  ( a l + a 2 )  5 - d  ( a l )  + d  ( a 2 )  ( d ( a l + a 2 + 1 )  . 
Proposition 8. 8. The f i v e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i v i s o r  methods are s t a b l e .  
Proposition 8.9. The method o f  Hami l ton  i s  s t a b l e .  
A symmet r i c  method M i s  s a i d  t o  encourage coalitions i f  a f t e r  
c o a l e s c i n g  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s e a t s  s a t i s f y i n g  
* - * 
b  2 - a  + a ,  and  t o  encourage schisms i f  b  5 - a  + a . ( S e e  E r l a n g ,  
1907,  B a l i n s k i  and Young 1978b,  1 9 7 9 a ) .  
Proposition 8.11. The method of Jefferson is the unique uniform 
balanced method that encourages coalitions. 
Proposition 8.12. The method of Adams is the unique uniform 
balanced method that encourages schisms. 
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